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A Perception Based Field Study 
By 
Gomes Cambuta 
The decline in agricultural output over the years and the subsequent pervasive 
food crisis in most of Africa have motivated governments and international organizations 
to develop a variety of strategies, policy alternatives and programs aimed at promoting 
agricultural production and food security. Many of these strategies have been conceived 
and implemented by international organizations, and in some cases the strategies have 
fail to address the root cause of failure of the agricultural sector to perform to its 
potential. 
Therefore, this field study uses scenario analysis to engage key players in the 
agriculture industry to identify causes of Angola’s loss of production capacity over the 
years, the factors needed to revitalize the agricultural-led economy, factors that can help 
stabilize the agricultural sector and conditions required for the development and 
coordination of the food supply chain in Angola.  
The framework provided in the paper was based on an evaluation of perceptions 
of future demand for locally produced agricultural products; the country’s supply 
response capability; the role of the informal and formal markets; infrastructure needs; and 
the development of formal supply chains for domestic and export markets. 
The methodology used was an adaptation of a methodology used in Industry 
Strategic Planning and Coordination, and the Technological Demands Determination by 
Prospective Analysis. 
The study revealed that in spite of its high resource endowment, Angola will first 
need to address institutional and structural agricultural development constraints and 
develop systems that allow better coordination of development efforts among institutions, 
before it is able to produce food for export markets. The development priority for the next 
five years includes creating conditions that stimulate local production, help the country 
produce enough to become food self sufficient, and gradually reduce food imports. 
Nevertheless, the production for import substitution should not preclude efforts towards 
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Angola, with its broad natural resource base, has the potential to become the 
bread basket of Southern Africa and one of the richest countries in Africa. The broad 
resource base accounted for the agricultural development of the pre-independence period 
and in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s agriculture led Angolan exports and was the main 
source of revenues into the Angolan economy. In spite of its rich resource base, the war 
drove the country into a depleted inventory of consumption goods and depleted 
productivity in the agricultural sector. Farmers and other potential economic private 
investors are eager to see changes that lead to more prosperous economic activities. They 
are psychologically prepared to welcome government programs that trigger changes. 
However, as a result of the long exhausting war, a large part of the economically active 
population is completely disillusioned and has reverted to economic activities that require 
less long term strategic planning. Prices of domestically produced goods are above world 
market prices as a result of high production costs, low output levels and high 
transportation costs.  
The civil war ended in April 2002 and signs of a quick agricultural sector 
recovery include: increased land area under cultivation; increased private investment in 
agriculture; increased aggregate agricultural output per harvesting season; and less 
dependence on international food aid. Despite these promising signs of recovery that has 2 
 
emerged, transforming agriculture into a sustainable productive sector and profitable 
businesses remains a major challenge. The challenge results from two main reasons: (i) 
for more than a decade, Angola was a centrally planned economy, hence most Angolan 
agri-food managers have not been exposed to the challenges of creating supply chains to 
respond to demand factors; (ii) food production trends in Africa have been marked by 
short periods of rises, followed by repeated cycles of decline. Therefore, inadequate 
investment towards agricultural development may drive Angola into the same cycle many 
African countries have experienced post independence. 
Angola is in dire need of a strategy that addresses all three forms of capital 
constraints:  human, financial and physical.  Heidhues et al. (2004) indicate that food 
production in Africa increased at 2.3% per year in the 1960s, yet it increased only at 
1.5% per year in the 1970s. When the government of Angola drafted the 2005-2006 
General Program “Programa Geral do Governo Para o Biénio 2005-2006”, it was noted 
that between 2001 and 2003, the agricultural share of the GDP did not grow beyond 8.2% 
per year. Therefore, the sector was considered to be fragile and vulnerable to unfavorable 
conditions such as bad weather, lack of quality agricultural inputs, and farmers with weak 
technical skills. The government program recognizes that there is an urgent need to 
address those constraints, and elevate the agricultural sector to a favorable and stable 
position in the Angolan economy
1
                                                 
1 Programa Geral do Governo Para o Biénio 2005-2006  
. The program, therefore, reaffirms the government’s 
commitment to make major investments in rural infrastructure and macroeconomic 
conditions that will lead to the re-establishment of sustainable farming systems, the 
development of a vibrant agricultural sector and the establishment of viable food supply 
chains in Angola. 3 
 
Agriculture is crucial to the future of Angola, particularly for the rural poor, even 
though the Angolan economy is dominated by the oil industry which accounts for 
approximately 51.7% of the GDP. Together with the diamond industry, they both account 
for 57% of the GDP. Furthermore, the oil industry makes up approximately 95% of 
Angolan exports and 80% of all government revenues. Current production levels average 
1.4 million barrels per day (bpd), making Angola second to Nigeria on the African 
continent. Future projections indicate that in 2008, production will reach 2 million bpd
2
The wholesale sector and other services account each for approximately 15% of 
the GDP, while the construction and public works, and the processing industries account 
for 4% each. The shift in exports from agriculture and manufacturing to oil, resulted in a 
smaller agricultural sector and larger services sector.  Despite their higher contribution to 
the GDP relative to agriculture, these sectors have limited capacity to generate 
employment. For instance, the Fund for Economic and Social Development [Fundo de 
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (FDES)] was created by the government in 2003. 
After one year of activity, it disbursed a total of $30 million in loans. These loans resulted 
in the creation of 4,500 jobs outside of the agricultural sector. The aggregate job creation 
effect by these four sectors is estimated at 341,000 job posts. The informal sector is 
, 
which shows an enormous growth potential. The issue is that internally the oil sector has 
only had marginal impact on employment creation because it is a capital intensive 
industry.  Creating an economy that utilizes the financial resources from the oil and 
diamond industries to address the constraints of the agricultural sector is key to 
developing a balanced and sustainable growth oriented economy that addresses the issue 
of excess labor. 
                                                 
2 http://www.angolaacontece.com/full.php?id=1496 (accessed December 2006) 4 
 
believed to be the single largest employment creator. However, statistics on the exact 
number of jobs created by the informal sector are unreliable (Angola: Perspectivas 
Economicas na Africa 2004/2005).  
Approximately 71 percent of the estimated 14 million Angolans rely on 
agriculture for their livelihoods (FAOSTAT Database). In spite of its low output levels 
relative to population growth, agriculture remains the second most important economic 
sector. In addition to the sector comprising of approximately 10 million of the estimated 
14 million inhabitants (FAOSTAT Database), it is also comprised of approximately 4.5 
million economically active people, or approximately 71% of the economically active 
population which has been fairly stable over time (see figure 1). Since agriculture 
constitutes a large share of national output and employs a large proportion of the labor 
force, the sector is critical to any development strategy.  
                    
Source: FAOSTAT Database 
 
Miracle (2006), emphasizes the role of agricultural development in the 
establishment of economic development programs because it affects the development 
in other sectors of the economy in several ways: through provision of goods and 5 
 
services needed elsewhere in the economy and for exports; through generation of 
rural purchasing power which can be a critical component for the stimuli needed to 
evoke satisfactory rates of development of other sectors; and through the generation 
of savings, investment and manpower needed elsewhere. The need for agricultural 
growth is due in part to its potential to generate both agricultural and non-agricultural 
employment.   
1.2 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this paper is to create development strategy options that lead to 
a quick recovery and the development of a vibrant agriculture sector in Angola. 
The main objective is supported by the following specific objectives:  
i.  identify the factors that have contributed to the loss of the country’s 
agricultural production capacity;  
ii.  understand the agricultural sector’s perceptions about the future of Angolan 
agriculture 
iii.  identify the factors needed to revitalize an agricultural-led economy; 
iv.  identify the factors that can help stabilize the agricultural sector, and  
v.  identify the conditions required for the development and coordination of the 
food supply chain.            
This paper provides a conceptual framework for agricultural development strategies 
based on a multitude of strategies and approaches pursued by other countries, which 
yielded a wide range of outcomes. The framework provided in the paper is based on an 
evaluation of perceptions of future demand for locally produced agricultural products; the 
country’s supply response capability; the role of the informal and formal markets; 6 
 
infrastructure needs; and the development of formal supply chains for domestic and 
export markets. A review of previous literature shows that African countries in general 
and mineral rich countries in particular, have pursued a variety of strategies to promote 























The literature reviewed assesses the interaction of factors that have the potential to 
either promote or hinder the development of the agricultural sector, and draw lessons 
from prior agricultural development strategies pursued by other countries, particularly 
Mozambique and Nigeria. In this section the study focuses on a review of the overall 
African development strategies and draws a comparison between Angola and 
Mozambique and between Angola and Nigeria. Two different typologies are used to 
compare Angola and Mozambique, and Angola and Nigeria.  Given that there are no 
clearly defined common indicators for each typology, the analysis will be conducted on 
the basis of results accomplished by each country towards stabilizing food security 
through local production and the contribution of the agricultural sector towards reducing 
poverty.  
2.1 African Agriculture Development Strategies in Perspective 
The decline in agricultural output over the years and the subsequent pervasive 
food crisis in most of Africa have motivated governments and international organizations 
to develop a variety of strategies, policy alternatives and programs aimed at promoting 
agricultural production and food security. Many of those strategies have been conceived 
and implemented by international organizations, and in some cases the strategies do not 
address the root cause of failure of the agricultural sector to perform to its potential. 
Heidhues et al. (2004) state that on average, a typical developing country in Africa is 
assisted by 30 aid institutions to develop and implement strategies, yet Africa is still far 
from achieving food and nutrition security. They further elaborate that the 8 
 
implementation of a strategy requires a clear formulation of: a conducive policy and 
institutional environment, a widely shared consensus about the strategy and its measures, 
the human capacity, and sufficient financial resources.  
Hughes (1988) establishes a link between strategies conceived and implemented 
by international organizations on behalf of recipient countries and their failure to 
accomplish the intended results. She states that since farmers are the central figures of 
agricultural development, ignoring the role of the farming families as entrepreneurs, risk-
takers, managers, innovators and workers, leads to the failure of development strategies 
and stagnation. Heidhues et al. and Hughes’ assessment leads to the assertion that African 
governments and donors face a joint challenge of rethinking future agricultural 
development strategies and making them more in line with the specific natural resource 
endowments, the socio-economic, political and institutional conditions of each recipient 
country. Agricultural development strategies must be seen as inextricably linked with the 
identification of needs, priorities, and constraints; with the creation of action plans; and 
finally with the implementation of those plans (Heidhues et al. 2004).  
According to Lele (1987), donors have been heavily involved in the African 
economic development processes. Lele supports this statement by indicating that 
following the 1973-74 drought, commitments for official development assistance (ODA)
3
                                                 
3 ODA is defined as those resource flows to developing countries by multilateral institutions and 
government aid agencies with a grant element of at least 25 percent and with the objective of promoting 
economic development.  
 
rose from $3.9 billion to $10.9 billion in 1980 and then declined slightly to $10.3 billion 
in 1982. Lele estimates that approximately 25 agencies gave ODA to Africa and a 
plethora of private voluntary agencies were involved in relief aid programs and have been 
reorienting their assistance towards longer-term development. In addition, the World 9 
 
Bank, the African Development Bank and some Oil Producer Economic Community 
(OPEC) sponsored agencies provided concessionary loans to African countries. Mellor et 
al. (1987) reiterates Lele’s view and affirms that recent foreign assistance to Africa has 
been massive in quantity and therefore, highly influential on national governments ability 
to make policy choices. Mellor also states that efforts by donors to develop food security 
strategies for African nations have very seldom produced tangible results or lasting 
impacts. Mellor et al. (1987) further suggests that donor’s pressure on recipient 
governments for attention to national-level policy issues is correct. However, they use the 
analogy of donor assistance to Asia and indicate that when donors applied similar 
pressure in Asia, in the mid-1960s, it was in the context of government support to 
institutions that could translate broad national directives into detailed policies. Therefore, 
national governments were staffed with a substantial number of highly skilled people 
who could collect data, do research and conduct detailed policy analysis. Mellor et al. 
conclude that in the case of agricultural research it is clear that priority must be given to 
the support of African institutional capacity to diagnose needs and to monitor experiences 
with agricultural investment. Abrahamsson & Nilsson (1995) suggest that when 
evaluating the performance of past development strategies in post-independence Africa it 
is important to note that development strategies were never perceived as a free choice in 
the sense that at the time of a country’s political independence it did not have 
development alternatives to choose from. Therefore, the implementation of a 
development strategy outcome is always affected by the power of social and economic 
structures of international players.  10 
 
Many African nations attained their independence between 1960 and1980. After 
independence was attained, the nations had high expectations of rapid development. The 
first generation of African leaders, influenced by prominent economists of that time from 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, adopted strategies focused 
on industrialization as the engine of economic growth and the key to transforming 
traditional economies (Heidhues et al. 2004). It was believed that the prospects for 
commodity exports were poor, and the desire to reduce dependence on manufactured 
imports was widespread on the continent. Agriculture was neglected to the secondary role 
of supplying raw materials and providing tax revenues that could finance fast growing 
economic sectors (Heidhues et al. 2004). Heidhues explains that Africa’s poor 
performance between 1970 and 1980 was reflected in the weak growth of the productive 
sector, poor exports performance, mounting debt, deteriorating social conditions, 
environmental degradation, and increasing decay of institutional capacity. The crisis 
prompted responses from organizations, resulting in a few initiatives of development 
plans such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), in 1980-85 and the Regional Plan for 
Africa (AFPLAN), 1978-1990. These two plans were African domestic policies designed 
under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). They were then followed 
by a set of policy initiatives, the Economic Adjustment Programs (ESAPs), based on the 
neo-liberal understanding of economic development held by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. These initiatives formed the framework within which 
agriculture and food security programs were developed (Heidhues et al. 2004). They 
observed also that the gap between food production and population growth was widening. 
Timmer (1991) clarifies that farm incomes are low in the developing countries not 11 
 
because peasants are irrational or lack knowledge of how to farm efficiently with the 
resources at their disposal, but because they lack the technology that would generate 
higher outputs and raise incomes.   
Hughes (1988) states that agricultural development only takes place when 
increased productivity and output are reflected in the raising of real incomes, and hence 
in raising rural standards of living. These immediate gains result in the deepening of the 
countryside’s economic activity, increasing off farm employment and increasing 
availability of building materials, furniture and household utensils.  Diao et al. (2006) 
strengthens Hughes’ argument and indicates that in order to fully mobilize a country’s 
social capability during the early stages of development, it is important to acknowledge 
the role of the agricultural sector and the farmers’ entrepreneurial potential. Diao et al. 
also explains that once the agricultural sector catches up with development, the growth 
effect emanating from agricultural development can lead to broader economic growth 
because agricultural outputs can be supplied into non-agricultural production processes 
such as agro-processing.   
2.2 Overview of the Angolan Agricultural Economy 
Angola is endowed with abundant fertile land, diverse climate with plentiful 
water, and natural conditions that offer the country an enormous potential to produce a 
wide range of crops all year round and become the bread basket of Southern Africa. 
However, these resources have not thus far been used to their potential. According to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER), the country has 
approximately 57.4 million hectares of arable land, but only approximately 3.2 million 
hectares (5%) was cultivated in the 2004/05 cropping season. Prior to independence, the 12 
 
country was self sufficient in all food commodities with the exception of wheat. Between 
the late 1960’s and the early 1970’s, Angola was a net exporter of coffee, maize, tobacco, 
sisal, beans, sugar, palm oil and rice.  Walker (1990) and Hodges (1987) estimate that in 
1972/73 Angola exported approximately 242,000 tons of coffee which earned the country 
approximately US$206 million, and became the world’s fourth largest coffee exporter 
only after Brazil, Colombia, and the Ivory Coast.  
The agricultural sector of the pre-independence period was characterized by a 
dual system, in which the commercial sector grew mostly cash crops, while the peasantry 
sector grew primarily staple food crops. Despite their low yields, peasants produced 
enough for household consumption and had surplus food crops, livestock, or coffee 
which they marketed to Portuguese rural settlers, because these settlers managed the rural 
trade system and had access to export markets. In spite of considerable progress towards 
promoting more commercial activities from the peasantry, which stimulated more 
production surplus, support for agricultural activities was directed primarily to 
commercial farming with the aim of encouraging Portuguese settlement in the rural 
Angola. Nonetheless, access of peasants to consumer goods, fertilizer, seeds, and 
implements such as hoes and machetes was ensured through a quasi-barter system. The 
settlers also provided credit for consumer goods to the peasants, and that credit was 
redeemed at harvest time.   
The major contributing factors to Angola becoming an agricultural export country 
in the pre-independence period included its: favorable climatic conditions; abundance of 
surface as well as undersurface water; abundant rainfall; fertile soils with varying texture 
and composition; establishment of irrigation schemes and mechanized agriculture; the 13 
 
existence of research and extension services responsive to farmers needs; availability of 
agricultural credit and market incentives; the post World War II period of high demand 
for food and the coffee boom; and an efficient rural trading system. The combination of 
these factors determined the success of the agricultural sector in the pre-independence 
Angola and prompted an impetus for quick economic growth. 
Upon independence from Portugal, in 1975, the country merged into a civil war 
that lasted for 27 years and caused more than 1 million deaths. During the war, millions 
of rural families fled their villages in search of safe refuge. Some of the consequences of 
the prolonged civil war were: a) loss of rural families’ productive assets; b) completely 
devastated rural infrastructure; c) completely disrupted farming and production support 
systems; and d) the disappearance of all formal supply chains. The war also resulted in 
the reversal of the country’s agricultural production trends. Between 1960 and 1974 
agriculture contributed the largest share to GDP (led by coffee export), followed by 
diamonds and oil.  However, the war resulted in a dramatic decline in agricultural output 
which rendered the country dependent on food aid to meet its internal food requirements. 
At independence eve, the Portuguese rural traders abandoned the country. The sudden 
departure of rural traders who ensured the connectivity between peasants and the 
suppliers of industrial goods and agricultural input suppliers, disrupted the rural trade 
network and in turn, the production systems. In response to the post-independence 
agricultural sector crisis, the pro-socialist Angolan government resorted to confiscation of 
all formally Portuguese owned farms and converted them into state owned enterprises, 
created state owned companies that delivered inputs to farmers (including access to farm 
machinery), purchased agricultural output, and farmers were organized into cooperatives.  14 
 
In addition, the government established trading companies in an attempt to remedy the 
collapse of rural trade. However, all of the following led to the breakdown of the 
agricultural sector in the post-independence period: the severity of the civil conflict 
which resulted in massive influx of rural families into urban centers; the overall neglect 
of the agricultural sector resulting from a wholly inadequate planning; institutional 
inefficiencies of the trading companies; and weak managerial and technical skills of the 
post-independence agricultural development planners.   
In summary, the collapse of the Angolan agricultural sector is blamed primarily 
on the abrupt abandonment of Portuguese settlers, who were in charge of the: commercial 
farming sector; food processing industry; and the systems of rural trade and distribution 
of agricultural inputs. However, the complete devastation of production and support 
systems which led to a continuous decline of agricultural output was exacerbated by the 
complete disappearance of rural trade systems and the prolonged civil war which forced 
massive influx of rural families into urban centers.      
According to USAID, approximately 68 percent of the population lives below the 
poverty line, living on less than $1.70 per day, of whom 28 percent live in extreme 
poverty that is on less than $0.70 per day. Poverty level is estimated to be around 97% 
among rural families primarily due to the lack of production incentives and difficult 
access to markets
4
                                                 
4 
. Furthermore, the extractive industry is capital intensive; hence it does 
not have the capacity to absorb the large numbers of demobilized soldiers and ex-
combatants who constitute a great mass of unskilled work force that need to be 
transformed into peace-time economic pursuits.  Although Angola’s current oil 
production levels average 1.4 million bpd, making the country the second-largest oil 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/58/35350793.pdf  (accessed on 12/18/06) 15 
 
producer in sub-Saharan Africa and the seventh-largest supplier to the United States, the 
revenues have not contributed to the increased social or economic welfare of the majority 
of Angolan citizens.  
According to Diao et al. (2006), since almost all rural households depend directly 
or indirectly on agriculture, and given the large contribution of this sector to the overall 
economy, it is obvious that agriculture should be a key component of growth and 
development. Diao et al. notes that both the green revolution and the induced innovation 
model introduced by Hayami and Rutan, in 1985, revealed that agricultural productivity 
growth requires fostering the linkages between the agricultural and nonagricultural 
sectors.    
2.2.1 Angolan Agricultural Production Trends for Main Food Crops, 
Between 1971 and 2006  
The objective of this section is to analyze production trends of crops that 
constitute the main diet of Angolan rural families, before and after independence. The 
analysis focuses on production levels of two cropping seasons. That is, prior to 
independence, in 1975, and approximately ten cropping seasons after independence.  
Table 1 shows that from 1971 to 1973, the Angola food crop production systems 
achieved stable levels that ensured domestic supplies as well as exports. The political 
crisis of the aftermath of independence and the subsequent widespread civil conflict 
drove production below subsistence levels.  
The approximately four years of peace and gradual political stability (from 2001 
to 2006) has shown promising agricultural recovery signals, with all crops showing 
continuous output increases, except for rice (fig.4). Nonetheless, the increases in 16 
 
production levels have not matched population growth. Therefore, in spite of higher 
production levels in the post-independence period than they were before independence, 
Angola has not been able to produce adequate surplus to meet its consumption needs. 
Table 1: Agricultural Production of Main Staple Crops Between 1971 and 2005-2006 
Cropping Season Maize Beans Peanuts Potatoes Cassava Rice
1971-72 709,750      65,479       26,936        138,757      1,134,262     57,604        
1972-73 853,847      53,742       26,679        59,941        1,408,593     53,000        
1986-87 287,853      41,288       13,862        31,454        1,314,270     2,966          
1987-88 270,000      -             -             -              796,000        2,000          
1988-89 204,000      -             -             -              764,000        3,000          
1989-90 180,000      -             -             -              740,000        3,000          
1990-91 299,000      -             -             -              871,000        4,000          
1991-92 369,000      -             -             -              1,024,000     4,000          
2001-02 426,300      57,895       29,966        -              5,620,419     -              
2002-03 545,150      66,121       60,190        301,804      5,699,331     15,607        
2003-04 576,917      75,965       54,732        331,551      6,637,623     20,620        
2004-05 720,275      108,116     66,003        307,293      8,806,208     8,648          
2005-06 565,000      100,000     67,000        593,000      8,809,000     9,000          
Crop Type and Production (in MT)
S
ource: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2004-05 Cropping Season Report; 
FAO-WFP 2001/02 & 2003/04 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions to Angola; 
FAOSTAT Database; Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery; Angola: The Promise of 
Riches. 
 
Fig. 2 shows steady increases in maize production trends, from 2001-02 to 2004-
05 cropping seasons, with a slight decrease in 2005-06. However, despite production 
increases from 2001 to 2006, the overall output has remained below pre-independence 
period.   17 
 
  
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2004-05 Cropping Season 
Report; FAO-WFP 2001/02 & 2003/04 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions to 
Angola; FAOSTAT Database; Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery; Angola: The 
Promise of Riches. 
 
Figure 3, shows that in spite of a relative decrease in production level of beans, in 
1972 – 73 and 1986 – 87 cropping seasons, the overall production trend of that crop 
between 1971 and 2006 was upward facing. The figure shows that production of beans 




Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2004-05 Cropping Season 
Report; FAO-WFP 2001/02 & 2003/04 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions to 
Angola; FAOSTAT Database; Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery; Angola: The 
Promise of Riches. 
 
Figure 4, shows that contrary to the beans production, over the years between 
1971 and 2006 the production of rice was continuously decreasing.   
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2004-05 Cropping Season 
Report; FAO-WFP 2001/02 & 2003/04 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions to 
Angola; FAOSTAT Database; Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery; Angola: The 
Promise of Riches. 19 
 
 
Figure 5, shows that similar to the production of beans (fig.3) the production of 
peanuts has more than doubled over the period under review. It also shows that the 
production of peanuts reached its highest in the cropping season 2005 – 06. 
  
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2004-05 Cropping Season 
Report; FAO-WFP 2001/02 & 2003/04 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions to 
Angola; FAOSTAT Database; Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery; Angola: The 
Promise of Riches. 
 
Figure 6, shows that the production of potatoes faced a down ward trend in the 
years following independence, but the cropping season 2002 – 03 witnessed a reversal of 
the down ward trend and production begun to increase, reaching its maximum in the 
cropping season 2005 – 06. 20 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2004-05 Cropping Season 
Report; FAO-WFP 2001/02 & 2003/04 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions to 
Angola; FAOSTAT Database; Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery; Angola: The 
Promise of Riches. 
 
Figure 7, shows an approximately eight fold increasing in production levels, in the 
period under review. The high production levels in cassava can be attributed, to some 
degree, to the fact that cassava production levels may reflect a cumulative of two to three 
years because unlike other crops that are harvested at the end of each cropping season, 





Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2004-05 Cropping Season 
Report; FAO-WFP 2001/02 & 2003/04 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions to 
Angola; FAOSTAT Database; Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery; Angola: The 
Promise of Riches.  
 
According to the USDA-Foreign agricultural service report, in 2005 the overall 
Angolan agricultural production increased by 28 percent. The report attributes the 
production increase to a combination of factors such as favorable weather conditions, 
expansion of cultivated area following resettlement of the internally displaced people, 
and distribution of agricultural inputs as part of the resettlement process. This assessment 
coincides with the MINADER 2004-05 cropping season report which indicates that 
productivity levels remained very low across the country, ranging between 0.4 and 0.7 
MT/ha for maize, between 0.3 and 0.4 MT/ha for beans, between 1.5 and 2.5 MT/ha for 
potatoes while for rice the productivity averaged 0.7 MT/ha. Therefore, overall 
production levels do not reflect efficient allocation and utilization of productive 
resources.  22 
 
The fact that Angola is at an embryonic development stage, an increase in 
production that is not a result of increasing productivity of the land, labor and other 
resources merits attention, to avoid production declines and stagnation of the sector in 
years following production increases.   
2.2.2 Angola’s Current Food Supply Response Capability   
Table 2 provides a summary of food requirements and the country supply 
response capability. In spite of an overall agricultural production increase of 28 percent in 
2005, Angola remained a food deficit country. Therefore the country has resorted to food 
imports, both commercial and food aid, to meet the short fall.  
Table 2: Food Balance Levels Estimated at the 2005-06 Marketing Season  
Description  Type of Commodity (in metric tones) 
Maize  Rice  Beans  Peanuts  Potatoes  Wheat 
A. Domestic availability 
A.1 Opening stock 
* Commercial sector 
* Retained by farmers 
 
A.2 Total production 
(2004-05) 
 
B. Total requirements 
B.1 Human consumption 




B.3 Closing stock 
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 Source: Gabinete de Segurança Alimentar-MINADER, 2004-05 Cropping Season Report  
 
Fig. 8 illustrates an upward trend in food commercial imports from 1979 to 2002. 
The increasing food import levels over time tends to reiterate the idea that the increases 23 
 
that have been registered in production levels of key food crops are still inadequate to 
match food demand resulting from population growth over the past two decades.   
 
Source: FAOSTAT Data base (accessed Dec. 2006) 
Fig. 9, on the other hand, shows that in 2004 Angola imported approximately  
US$ 688,169,854 worth of food commodities, to cover the short fall and meet total food 
requirements. Seven countries constituted the 2004 top exporters of food to Angola, of 
which Portugal led with 28 percent share, followed by South Africa, Brazil and the USA, 





Source: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Global agriculture information network; 
Angola export guide, Angola’s import regulations and customs 2006   
 
Diao et al. (2006) state that the issue of meeting domestic demand for food 
implies that agricultural growth should at least match population growth in order to avoid 
stagnant development. Angola has the opportunity to take advantage of its being at an 
early stage of development and can pursue agricultural-led development strategies that 
stimulate broad based economic growth. Diao et al. reiterate that without efficient 
agricultural productivity, the traditional economy cannot overcome the fixed supply of 
natural resources and thus over time it cannot generate adequate supply of food nor can it 
promote sustained economic growth.   
Timmer (1991) establishes a symbiotic relationship between agriculture and other 
sectors of the economy and indicates that close integration of agricultural policy with 
overall macroeconomic and trade policies is essential for rapid economic growth which is 
essential to have sustained reductions in poverty.       
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2.3 The Role of Mineral Revenues in Pursuit of Agricultural Development  
There is a large body of empirical work that establishes a negative relationship 
between resource abundance and economic performance (Stevens 2003). Zafar (2004) 
states that Gabon’s growth performance since independence has been respectable, 
depending significantly on the performance of the oil sector. Its rich petroleum reserves 
have historically accounted for close to half of the GDP, more than 80% of its export 
receipts and 65% of its tax revenues. For many years, Gabon was Africa’s third largest 
oil producer after Nigeria and Angola, and had the third largest reserves with close to two 
billion barrels. However, a major consequence of the oil boom in Gabon has been what is 
commonly referred to by economists as the “Dutch disease” (Zafar, 2004).  According to 
Zafar, the deindustrialization of a country’s economy when natural resources are 
discovered results in a large inflow of foreign currency, inducing an export boom and 
causing an appreciation in the country’s currency.  The adverse affects are that the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors is greatly reduced. 
According to Rosser (2004), mineral booms have strong effects on the labor force; yet 
little is known about their ultimate impact on the distribution of income and poverty 
alleviation. He further explains that in general, scholars suggest that economically 
successful resource rich countries have been able to break the resource curse because 
they have adopted radical and well coordinated economic policies, particularly in the 
macroeconomic and fiscal realms.   
Contrary to Stevens’ and Zafar’s argument, Ramkissoon (2002) argues that 
abundant natural resources have played an important role in the economic development 
of many states, large and small. Rosser supports Ramkissoon’s point and argues that 26 
 
Botswana (a mineral-rich country that at independence, in 1966, was one of the 25
th 
poorest countries in the world, and that grew to become an upper middle income country 
by late 1990) was able to break the resource curse because its government adopted sound 
economic policies and provided good management of windfall gains.  Rosser (2004) 
makes an assertion that in addition to Botswana, high rates of economic growth and 
poverty reduction accomplished by mineral-rich countries also includes Chile, Malaysia 
and Indonesia. To further investigate the role of mineral in economic development, the 
Nigeria and Indonesia cases are reviewed due to their similarities with Angola.   
2.3.1 The Role of Oil Revenues in Promoting Sustainable Economic 
Development: The Case of Nigeria and Indonesia 
Angola and Nigeria are both sub-Saharan African oil-rich countries (the two 
largest oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa). Angola and Nigeria are located along the 
Atlantic coast, they have enormous agricultural potential to become food self-sufficient, 
yet both are heavily dependent on food imports with a significant component of food aid. 
The fact that Abdullahi (1985), Ijere (1986), Kyle (1997) and Ross (2003) consider 
Nigeria an example of an oil-rich country that has failed to promote sustainable economic 
development, albeit its enormous natural resource base prompts an opportunity for this 
study to draw lessons that Angola may consider before pursuing economic development 
strategies.   
The contrasting experiences of two oil exporters, Nigeria and Indonesia, provide 
strong support for an emphasis on agricultural investment coupled with an exchange rate 
policy designed to avoid over-appreciation (Kyle 1997). Zafar (2004) suggests that 
although governments can do much to offset the effects of the “Dutch disease”, too 27 
 
frequently they do not. Ross (2003) argues that a sharp rise in Nigeria’s petroleum 
exports in the 1960s and early 1970s led to an appreciation of the exchange rate. The 
higher exchange rate made it virtually impossible for firms in the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors to sell their goods profitably abroad. Instead of devaluating the 
currency, the government kept the currency overvalued for fear of inflation. Ross states 
that the result was that booming oil exports crowded out agricultural and manufacturing 
exports, and hence, the jobs in those sectors. In 2000, Nigeria received 99.6 percent of its 
export income from oil, making it the world’s most oil-dependent country (Ross 2003). 
Ross suggests that in general, the more that states depend on mineral exports, the more 
likely they are to suffer the effects of the “Dutch disease”. Since Nigeria is remarkably 
dependent on oil, it has been highly susceptible to those economic shocks. 
The Indonesian government adopted different strategies than Nigeria. Ross argues 
that in the 1960s and 1970s, the Indonesian government adopted many programs targeted 
at the poor, including universal primary education, price controls on food and kerosene, 
and rural pubic works projects; the Nigerian government did nothing comparable. 
Contrary to Nigeria, the Indonesian government also took measures to enhance 
agricultural production and to devaluate the exchange rate, allowing exports to remain 
competitive, and avoiding the collapse of agricultural exports.  
According to Kyle (1997), Indonesia followed a policy of emphasizing 
agricultural infrastructure and technological improvement with modern high yielding 
varieties, as part of an overall economic policy which resulted in high non-oil growth 
rates over sustained periods. Kyle explains that in the case of Indonesia, agriculture 
received a large share of public investment, more than 20% in the initial years of the oil 28 
 
boom and he concludes that Nigeria’s example is in many ways the opposite of 
Indonesia’s. However, despite the fact that Nigeria is considered to have failed to 
promote and sustain a broad-based economic development, it offers important lessons 
that may help countries, such as Angola, that are at the beginning of the development 
path to view economic development in light of its multiple sectors. According to 
Donaldson (1991), Agricultural development must involve mobilization of resources, 
expansion of output, increased production efficiency of resources, technological 
innovation and an adequate balance between and within sectors. Timmer (1991) urges 
that inappropriate policies are the major constraint limiting the pace of agricultural 
development in the developing world. The role of the government is central to the 
alignment of all these development factors to promote sustainable economic 
development. The government creates an enabling environment that encourages 
smallholder farmers to respond to expanded growth opportunities as they arise.  
Successive Nigerian Governments maintained that commercial banks should not 
neglect agriculture and related activities because agriculture and its related activities were 
the chief agents for the mobilization of savings (Ijere 1986). However, traditional 
commercial lending requirements rendered government initiatives fruitless. In response to 
the failed government policies that mandated commercial banks to provide agricultural 
loans, in the mid 1970s the Nigerian Federal Government established the Nigerian 
Agricultural Bank Ltd. which later changed name to the Nigerian Agricultural and 
Cooperative Bank (NACB). The objective of the bank was to promote “rapid 
transformation, expansion and modernization of agriculture in all facets” (Ijere 1986). 
This objective was to be achieved with massive, yet efficient injections of funds into 29 
 
agricultural enterprises in the country. The bank had a smallholder direct loan scheme 
designed to provide loans to smallholder farmers who did not otherwise have access to 
finances. In 1977, the government established a credit guarantee fund which was intended 
to be an incentive for commercial banks to finance agricultural activities as a complement 
to the NACB (Ijere 1986). In addition, the government established concessional tariffs for 
foreign investments into the agricultural sector, adopted monetary policy guidelines with 
prescribed lending ratios for loans and advances to different activities and because 
agriculture was the preferred sector, it received 6-8% of all commercial bank loans (Ijere 
1986). In 1985 Nigeria launched its own “green revolution” which targeted a 4% annual 
growth rate. However, the sector grew only at 1% versus the estimated 6.6% required 
growth rate for Nigeria to become food self-sufficient (Abdullahi 1985). Abdullahi states 
that conversely, in the early stages of economic development, the agricultural sector 
produced adequate volumes to meet Nigeria’s domestic demand, earned the country most 
of its foreign currency and encouraged the establishment of pioneer agro-processing 
industries. The success of early stages of economic development was not maintained 
because the planning process ignored the essential links between agriculture and other 
sectors of the economy and instead, focused on compartmentalization of individual 
sectors of the economy (Abdullahi 1985).  
Similar to Nigeria, shortly after independence Angola adopted agricultural 
development strategies with a strong credit component. In addition to the “Banco de 
Poupanças e Crédito, formerly Banco Popular de Angola” (approximately from 1978 to 
1994), the Angolan government established the “Caixa de Agro-pecuária e Pescas 
(CAP)” and the “Fundo de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Agrário (FADA)” to revitalize the 30 
 
agricultural sector. However, similar to Nigeria, those initiatives failed because of a lack 
of appropriate development strategies.     
2.3.2 The Impact of Post-war Agricultural-led Economic Development in 
Promoting Sustainable Development: The Case of Mozambique   
Angola and Mozambique are both former Portuguese colonies, both attained 
independence in 1975, and then both opted for a political and economic socialist 
orientation and both countries merged into prolonged civil wars. When analyzed purely 
from an agricultural productivity potential stand point, both Angola and Mozambique 
have adequate potential to become food self-sufficient. However, they have both been 
heavily dependent on food imports with a significant portion from food aid. The key 
factor to consider when comparing Angola and Mozambique is that the civil war in 
Mozambique ended in 1992 (ten years earlier than the war in Angola). Therefore, 
Mozambique has gone through development stages that can offer lessons to Angola.  
Mozambique experienced almost 17 years of civil war which affected all sectors 
of the economy, especially agriculture. Mozambique suffered a complete devastation of 
its rural infrastructure including its road network. Therefore, the already fragile market 
structure became non-functional and production and marketing activities were marginal 
at best. After the signing of the general peace agreement in 1992 and democratic 
elections in 1994, the government established development policies that freed the 
agricultural sector from centrally planned state intervention. The reforms targeted 
agricultural management, pricing, market allocation of agricultural resources, 
liberalization of pricing systems and privatization of state assets. Economic reform, initial 
rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, and the rapid post-conflict expansion in agricultural 31 
 
production also stimulated a small agribusiness sector (Pitcher, M. 1999). Agricultural 
inputs such as fertilizer and agrochemicals were declared not subject to any tariff. All of 
these factors have played a role in stimulating production increases.  
Although many factors may have played a role in reducing rural poverty in 
Mozambique, agriculture is regarded to have played a leading role. There is a consensus 
among various researchers, however, that current results have been accounted for by 
increases in production through expansion of cultivated areas, as opposed to more 
efficient use of productive resources. According to World Bank (2000), researchers raise 
concerns that unless Mozambique adopts policies that promote increased adoption of 
modern agricultural techniques and inputs, the sector risks stagnation.  
Similarly to Mozambique, with the end of civil war in Angola, the government 
designed a resettlement program for internally displaced people and families of ex 
combatants.   Allocation of land for agriculture production and the distribution of seeds 
and tools were the main components of the program. As a result of the resettlement 
program, there have been production increases and the subsequent reduction of food 
imports, as reported by the MINADER the USDA. However, both the MINADER and 
the USDA have made it clear that production increases have resulted from expansion of 
the cultivated land, as opposed to adoption of improved agricultural techniques.  
Similar to the MINADER and USDA reports, participants in this study cautioned 
that the government, the NGOs and the private sector will need to promote investment 
that lead to more efficient agricultural production systems in order to avoid decline in 
yields and the stagnation of the agricultural sector in the next few years, following few 
years of production increases.          32 
 
2.4 Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
Strategies conceived and implemented by international organizations on behalf of 
recipient countries have very seldom produced tangible results or lasting impacts. 
Inappropriate policies are the major constraint limiting the pace of agricultural 
development in the developing world. Donor development programs in Africa would be 
more effective if they focused on building capacity of national institutions to diagnose 
needs and monitor experiences with agricultural investments.  
Contrary to Indonesia, Nigeria failed to promote an agricultural based economic 
development, not because it did not want to, but because it used inefficient development 
strategies.  Similar to Mozambique, Angola has been experiencing increased aggregate 
levels of agricultural output after the end of civil war. However, the increases are a result 
















Prior researchers have used primarily surveys, case studies and analysis of 
secondary data to analyze agricultural development strategies in developing countries. 
Kyle (1997) did an analysis of secondary data to compare the economic development of 
Angola and Mozambique, and Indonesia and Nigeria. Ross (2003) and Zafar (2004) did 
an analysis of secondary data to compare the impact of mineral resources use in 
promoting economic development in Indonesia and Nigeria. EMBRAPA used surveys to 
evaluate people’s perceptions regarding agricultural and industrial development 
prospects. Lyford et al. used scenario analysis to assess industry leaders’ perceptions 
regarding the future of industries.  
Because there are no reliable data on Angola and there is a limited number of 
studies conducted on Angola, this study will be based on information derived from field 
work conducted using scenario analysis. The use of scenario analysis was evaluated to be 
the most suitable approach for Angola because it creates an environment for vigorous 
debate and exchange of ideas, thereby creating an appropriate atmosphere for eliciting 
problems and identifying solutions. The study will be conducted through a combination 
of key informant interviews and scenario analysis. The key informant interviews will be 
conducted using semi-structured questionnaires, while the scenario analysis will be 
conducted in group discussions. Key informants will include people from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER), Angolan Development Bank (BDA), 
the diamond company ENDIAMA,  the Angolan oil exploration company “Sonangol”. 
The scenario analysis participants, on the other hand, will include people from 34 
 
MINADER, Faculty of Agronomic Sciences of Agostinho Neto University (FCA), the 
food/feed processing sector, the farming community, input suppliers, formal and informal 
agricultural commodity market operators, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
financial institutions.  
The scenario analysis will be preceded by a pre-test to assess current perceptions 
about future development prospects of the agricultural sector. Approximately three weeks 
later, a post-test will be administered to individuals who participated in the scenario 
analysis exercise to assess changes in their perceptions about the future of the agricultural 
sector in Angola.  
The pre-test instrument was designed to assess each participant’s perceptions 
regarding the factors that have contributed to the loss of the country’s production 
capacity, the factors needed to revitalize the agricultural-led economy, to identify the 
factors that will help to stabilize the agricultural sector and determine the conditions 
required for the development and coordination of the food supply chain. The post-test, on 
the other hand, was designed to assess changes in each participant’s perceptions after 
their participation in scenario analysis. 
The scenario analysis was designed to create an enabling environment for the 
exchange of ideas, generate intense debate among participants, and effect changes in 
participants’ perceptions.  Contrary to the pre and post-test which will give a measure of 
changes in individual’s perceptions, the scenario analysis will give a measure of 
collective opinion, which will reflect groups’ perceptions.  The assumption that 
encouraged the use of scenario analysis was that the participation in the scenario analysis 
will cause significant changes in participants’ perceptions. 35 
 
The scenario analysis will start with a discussion of objectives and the importance of the 
study by the facilitator. After clarifying the objectives, the facilitator will read the 
scenarios to the participants, followed by break out groups to allow in depth analysis of 
each scenario.  Each group will be given copies of the scenario to be analyzed (see fig. 
10).  









































     
Figure 10: Time line for Data Collection                           
The subgroups will consist of no more than five people. In situations where there 
are more than 20 participants, additional groups will be formed starting with scenario 4. 
The group discussions results will be collected by the facilitator and each group will 
report their key points and main recommendations to the larger audience in a plenary 
session. The proposed methodology emphasizes the pre-assessment of current 
perceptions about future development prospects of the agricultural sector and post-
assessment after the scenario analysis. The pre and post-test will help assess attitude 36 
 
changes as a result of the scenario analysis. The scenario analysis will be based on a 
modified framework that results from a combination of Lyford et al. (2002), “A 
Framework for Industry Strategic Planning and Coordination (ISPC) (see figure 11)” and 
“The Technological Demands Determination by Prospective Analysis”, by The Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Cooperation (EMBRAPA)
5
3.1 The Modified Lyford’s Framework for Industry Strategic Planning and 
Coordination  
. The resulting hybrid framework will 
comprise of five stages, as indicated in fig. 11.A.  
Figure 11.A illustrates that the modified Lyford’s framework pre-test and scenario 
validation is equivalent to the “process initiation” in the original Lyford’s framework 
(fig. 11).  This modification is in line with the framework for industry strategic planning 
and coordination which emphasizes “process initiation” as a logical first phase because it 
fosters agreement among industry leaders of the ISPC which is based on some level of 
commonalities, shared problem areas, and the possibility of shared benefits from industry 
actions that facilitate improved industry performance. The scenario validation is a key 
starting point for this study because it will elicit major constraints and uncertainties to the 
development of the agricultural sector and the potential development opportunities, 
which in turn will help to envisage possible structural changes based on perceptions and 
realities. This modification is also in line with EMBRAPA’s Technological Demands 
Determination by Prospective Analysis framework in that they both start with 
                                                 
5 A conceptual and methodological framework, as well as strategy for setting agricultural R&D priorities 
based on client demands, in a large public agricultural research organization in Brazil, EMBRAPA 
(Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation). It is a result of a five year project aiming to develop 
strategy, conceptual framework and methodology for determining R&D client demands using technological 
demands prospective analysis in agricultural production chains (APC).  
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brainstorming sessions with a group of experts to either formulate or validate scenarios 






























Figure 11: Lyford’s Framework for Industry Strategic Planning and Coordination 




Figure 11.A: The modified Lyford’s Framework for Industry Strategic Planning and 
Coordination  
 
The analysis of prospective scenarios in the modified framework  (figure 11-A) is 
equivalent to the Lyford’s “situational analysis” because the analysis of prospective 
scenarios will help to update existing information to create changes in currently held 
perceptions about the future of the development of the agricultural sector in Angola, 
whereas the Lyford’s situational analysis focuses on developing a comprehensive, up-to-
date understanding of the evolving industry.  The interviews with key informants from 
sectors other than agriculture, complements and gives more validity to the information 
gathered during the scenario analysis. 
The post-test in the modified framework is equivalent to the overall phase 2 






















Lyford’s framework is pursued by an industry, to ensure the best overall industry 
strategies are selected based upon the knowledge developed and the choices made in the 
strategizing process. The post-test, on the other hand, allows the assessment of patterns of 
changes in participants’ perceptions. The assessment of changes in participants’ 
perceptions guide strategy choices because those changes give a measure of shared 
understanding of the agricultural sector’s situation developed in the course of scenario 
analysis.  
The choice of strategy options in the modified framework is equivalent to the 
“implementation and coordination of strategy options” in the Lyford’s framework. It is a 
stage where the researcher formulates alternative development strategies using the 
information gathered in the course of the study.  
The strategy review and validation in the modified framework is similar to the 
“strategy review and reevaluation” from the original Lyford’s framework. This phase 
involves sharing the recommended strategy options with key policy makers within the 
Angolan Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Chevron and the sectors 
represented in the study for reactions and adoptions of the most feasible strategy option.      
The choice of this methodology was based on the fact that the scenario analysis 
will help engage key players from different economic sectors in an interactive discussion 
to identify the factors that have contributed to the loss of the country’s production 
capacity, the factors needed to revitalize the agricultural-led economy, to identify the 
factors that will help to stabilize the agricultural sector and identify the conditions 
required for the development and coordination of the food supply chain. In addition, the 
scenario analysis will help participants to identify common problem areas, potential 40 
 
development opportunities and possible solutions to the agricultural industry problems. 
Lastly, because the scenario analysis will engage key players in an interactive dialogue, 
they will be better able to initiate the process of identification of each sub-sector’s 
complementary role in the process of revitalizing the agricultural sector, building trust 
among the various sub-sectors of the industry, building relationships and establishing an 
efficient food supply chain.    
3.2 Design of Development Scenarios 
The design of the hypothetical development scenario was based on a projection of 
4 possible and equally likely development situations that Angola could be in within the 
next 5 years (2007 to 2012). Each scenario can be found in Appendix 2.  The scenarios 
included scenario 1 which depicts a situation in which investments are made to stimulate 
more medium and large scale farming to promote the revitalization of an agricultural-led 
economy. Scenario 2, which depicts a situation whereby the development of the 
agricultural sector is built on production oriented for export markets. Scenario 3 depicts a 
situation where the smallholder farming sector is considered to be key in promoting the 
development of the agricultural sector and the creation of conditions for easy access to 
agricultural credit is the cornerstone of the strategy. Lastly, scenario 4 illustrates a 
situation where the government does disregard the Angolan agricultural potential and no 
investment is made to stimulate development of the agricultural sector.      
 3.3 Selection of Geographic Target and Identification of Participants 
The study will be conducted in five provinces of Angola, namely: Bengo 
(Luanda-green belt), Cabinda, Huambo, Kwanza Sul and Malanje. The selection of these 
provinces was based primarily on three criteria: the agricultural potential; the distance to 41 
 
primary markets; and the road conditions to access the main markets. According to Yin 
(1994), the use of multiple sources of data in case studies allows investigators to address 
a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and behavioral issues. Yin further clarifies that 
the most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of data is the 
development of converging lines of enquiry. Yin concludes that any finding or 
conclusion in a case study is likely to be more convincing and accurate if it is based on 
several different sources of information. Therefore, the choice of five provinces for this 
study will help draw more accurate conclusions regarding the agricultural sector in 
Angola than if the study was conducted in one province.  Below is a brief description of 
each province selected for the study. 
3.3.1 Bengo (Luanda green belt)  
Bengo is also known as the Luanda green belt because some of the Bengo agricultural 
production takes place along the Bengo/Luanda border and the production areas are 
considered part of the Luanda green belt. The inclusion of Bengo is essential because of 
its production potential for vegetables and fruits, particularly banana, and more 
importantly, because of its proximity to the Luanda market (see map, appendix 1), which 
is the largest market in Angola.     
3.3.2 Cabinda 
Cabinda, the far North West province of Angola (see map, appendix 1) offers great 
potential for production of tropical fruits and vegetables. In spite of its limited access to 
the Luanda market, it has the advantage of easy cross-border trade with the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo. In addition, the local market includes a 
major oil production area which demands fresh fruits and vegetables, meats and other 42 
 
agricultural products for its cafeteria which serves approximately 3,000 meals three times 
a day, year round.  
3.3.3 Huambo 
Huambo and Huila, both provinces in the central plateau (see map, appendix 1) have 
some common cropping systems and production characteristics, particularly with respect 
to maize, fruits of temperate climate and vegetables. Since both provinces have difficulty 
accessing the Luanda market, the fact that Huambo hosts the faculty of agronomic 
sciences of the state university “Universidade Agostinho Neto” gave Huambo a 
comparative advantage to be included in the study over Huila. 
3.3.4 Kwanza Sul    
Kwanza Sul, a province located in Southwest Angola (see map, appendix 1) is in the 
transition zone between the northern and the southern regions. Its agricultural production 
systems represent a hybrid between the northern and southern cropping systems. It has a 
strong potential for production of coffee, tropical fruits and vegetables, and can support a 
vibrant dairy industry. In addition, it is located at a relatively short distance 
(approximately 350 km) from the Luanda market. 
3.3.5 Malanje   
Malanje is located in the northern part of Angola (see map, appendix 1). It has an 
enormous potential for production of cotton, cassava, beans and cattle. Malanje has been 
the center for the dissemination of roots and tubers into the northern region and it hosts 
the recently built soil and plant pathology laboratory. Therefore, the office of food 
security “Gabinete de Segurança Alimentar- Ministerio da Agricultura e do 
Desenvolvimento Rural” (GSA-MINADER) suggested the inclusion of Malanje in this 43 
 
study. Given the limited amount of time to conduct the study, Malanje replaced Kuando 
Kubango, which was initially selected for its potential for agriculture production and its 
potential for boarder trade with Namibia and Botswana.  
3.3.6 Identification of Participants 
The key informants and participants for the scenario analysis will include people 
from the: Angolan Development Bank (BDA), diamond company ENDIAMA, Angolan 
oil exploration company “SONANGOL”, MINADER, Faculty of Agronomic Sciences of 
Agostinho Neto University (FCA), farming community, food/feed processors, input 
suppliers, formal and informal agricultural commodity market operators, Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and financial institutions, as stated at the beginning 
of this chapter. Chevron and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) partner NGOs will assist in the identification and invitation of participants for 
the study.  The intended numbers for each province to be invited are as follows: 
approximately 30 Angolan agricultural development practitioners; 4-6 supermarkets and 
commercial bankers, 4-6 input suppliers and food/feed processors; 12-15 farmers;  and 3-
5 Professors from the Faculty of Agronomic Sciences of Agostinho Neto University and 
the Agricultural Technical College (Instituto Medio Agrario do Tchivinguiro). 
3.4 Procedures Summary 
Participants will be identified and invited to participate in a day long roundtable session 
in each of the five provinces. Figure 10 shows that at the beginning of each session, the 
facilitator will discuss the objectives of the study and answer questions from participants. 
The session will be divided into eight stages, as follows: i) administration of the pre-test 
to participants, to assess their perceptions about the agricultural sector development, prior 44 
 
to the scenario analysis; ii) announcement of scenarios; (iii) formation of sub-groups for 
individual scenario analysis; (iv) distribution of copies of individual scenarios to each 
group; (v) scenario validation; (vi) scenario analysis.  
In situations where there are more than 20 participants, additional groups will be 
formed starting with scenario 4. The formation of sub-groups will be conducted in a 
randomized manner, but when necessary participants will be moved to another group to 
ensure that all groups have adequate diversity of background, which will encourage 
vigorous discussion
6
Approximately 3 weeks after the scenario analysis there will be the administration 
of post-test to individuals who participated in scenario analysis. 
; (vii) the groups will do scenario validation as a preliminary stage to 
scenario analysis. viii) the sub-groups will discuss the scenarios in a roundtable set up 
and reconvene to report their conclusions to the larger audience. During the report 
session, the facilitator will record any additional comments made by participants and at 









                                                 
6 Huambo was an exception. Due to limited number of participants (10 participants), only two group were 
formed to discuss scenarios 1 and 4. 45 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS REPORTING AND DATA ANALYSIS  
4.1 Data Collection  
 Two types of analyses were conducted, namely (i) qualitative scenarios analysis; and (ii) 
pre- and post-test quantitative analysis. The data came from five provinces in Angola and 
122 participants. Collecting primary field data in Angola presented challenges, but 
overall the scenario analysis approach was effective for collecting information on 
perceptions of the participants representing each food supply segment.   Figure 10 gives a 
time line for the data collection, which includes the pre-test, scenario analysis and the 
post-test.  
4.1.1 The Pre-test  
Each session began with a discussion of the objectives of the study followed by 
the pre-test. Farming participants had difficulties answering the pre-test questions for 
several reasons, among which: (i) some had low education levels; (ii) the farmers were 
not accustomed to being asked to give their opinions; and/or (iii) participating in group 
discussions was foreign to them. Their difficulty is most likely a result of approximately 
17 years of a centrally planned economy coupled with the 27 years of civil war. Because 
of this, the pre-test session lasted on average 2 hours, when we budgeted 45 minutes for 
that part of the activities. The instrument was not changed with the exception of questions 
14, 15 and 16, where participants were originally asked to give percentages which would 
add up to 100%. Those questions were impossible to attain accurate information due to 
the participants’ abilities, hence; we do not report those results in this document. 
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4.1.2 The Scenario Validation 
The participants began the scenario validation immediately after they received 
copies of the individual scenarios. During the scenario validation, participants were asked 
to indicate aspects of the scenario that: reflected the future of the agricultural sector; 
aspects of the scenario that did not reflect the future of the agricultural sector; and 
indicate aspects that might make the scenario more realistic. The scenario validation 
helped the participants to quickly engage in the discussion and adjust the scenario to 
more closely reflect their perceptions. The scenario validation created an enabling 
environment for further group discussion and analysis of the scenario. 
4.1.3 The Scenario Analysis  
The analysis of scenarios was the core of the research. It enabled participants to 
engage fully in the discussion and critically analyze uncertainties, development issues 
and identify opportunities. The group heterogeneity played an important role in 
stimulating vigorous debate and allowing a more diverse opinion about the future of the 
agricultural sector. The vigorous debate accounted for the changes that occurred in 
participants’ perceptions, and those changes were reflected in the groups’ ratings of the 
likelihood of occurrence of each scenario which is summarized in section 4.2. After the 
scenario analysis, the groups reported their findings to the larger group in a plenary 
session. 
4.1.4 The Post-test  
The post-test data collection constituted a big challenge for three reasons: (i) to 
make a second round of field visits to each province proved to be impossible because the 
ground travel to most study sites is not feasible because of the poor road conditions and 47 
 
air travel is marked by constant flight delays or cancellation with no prior notice; (ii) the 
costs in terms of time and missed opportunity for many of the participants was too high, 
many had to travel 3 to 4 hours (approximately 60 km) to get to a central meeting point to 
take the post-test (45 minutes – 2 hours) and then return home. To overcome some of 
these limitations imposed by poor infrastructure, the post-test was administered in two 
different ways. In Bengo-Luanda green belt, the researcher met the participants in a 
room, close to their fields and the post-test was administered to them. In Malanje, 
Cabinda, Kwanza Sul and Huambo, the post-test was administered separately to each 
individual who participated in the pre-test.  In those cases, the post-test was sent (hand 
carried) to those provinces. The identification sheet bore the name and phone number of 
individuals who took the pre-test and participated in the scenario analysis to ensure that 
no new participants were administered the post-test. One individual was chosen from 
each province to collect the surveys and send them to the researcher as email 
attachments. The total number of surveys collected and sent to the researcher was 42, but 
only 40 were entered into the data base because one of the surveys was blank and the 
other was a repetition from one respondent. Coordination difficulties and other problems 
resulted in the failure to obtain surveys from Huambo and Cabinda.    
4.1.5 Data Analysis Procedures 
The results of the scenario analysis are reported in a descriptive form. This part of 
the analysis provides the results of individual reactions expressed when the facilitator 
read the scenarios to the participants as well as the results of group discussions, including 
the scenario validation. 48 
 
The pre and post-test results were analyzed: (i) testing the hypothesis that the 
results of the pre and post-test were not significantly different; (ii) testing the magnitude 
and direction of change in participants’ perceptions (analysis of mean differences) in 
relation to the importance of the variables that were expected to be statistically 
significant,  (iii) assessing the relationship among variables utilizing pearson correlations; 
(iv) the chi-square from cross tabulation to test the hypothesis that the provinces that did 
not return post-test surveys were not significantly different from the ones that returned 
the post-test surveys.  
4.2 Scenario Analysis Results 
The analysis of potential scenarios for the future of Angola yielded information 
about groups’ perceptions and expectations regarding the role of agriculture in Angola. 
During the scenario validation and in the course of the analysis, in spite of the groups’ 
heterogeneity in terms of their business interests and economic activities, they defined 
agriculture as the catalyst of economic growth and the engine of sustainable economic 
development.  Agriculture was perceived by the participants to contribute to the 
stabilization of food security, reduce unemployment and rural poverty, and to contribute 
to the stabilization of the balance of payments.  
The participants noted that the scenarios were different and responded dramatically 
differently to each one, once read to the group. They immediately responded verbally 
after the scenarios were read, indicating that they perceived scenario 1 (Jump-Start 
Strategy for Stable Growth, see appendix 2-A) as the most probable scenario to occur 
within the next five years. They emphasized that the country’s great agricultural potential 
and that the current level of development programs implemented in Angola will promote 49 
 
the occurrence of scenario 1, and within the next five years Angola will produce enough 
to meet its domestic demand for food and gradually reduce food imports. They believe 
that Angola will have a stable agricultural sector within the next five years and they 
believe that scenario 4 (Agricultural Decline Scenario, see Appendix 2-A) has zero 
percent chance of occurring. Interestingly, once the participants finished debating about 
their individual scenario, they were asked to rank, as a group, the probability of that 
scenario occurring. Contrary to the participants’ perceptions expressed during the reading 
of the scenarios, table 3 indicates that within the next five years, scenario 3 (Renaissance 
of a Productive Smallholder Farming Sector, see Appendix 2-A) has the highest 
probability of occurring. This change in perceptions indicates that the discussion during 
the scenario analysis generated interesting debate and influential group members’ opinion 
had an effect on the other members’ opinion. During the group discussion of scenarios 1 
and 2 (Export Oriented Production, see Appendix 2-A) the participants perceived those 
scenarios to have equal probability of occurring within the next five years. Scenario 4, on 
the other hand, was perceived to be the least likely to occur, but the possibility of its 
occurring was not discarded as stated during the reading of other scenarios.  
Table 3 gives a summary of the participants’ perception that Angolan smallholder 
farmers have a strong potential to become successful agribusiness entrepreneurs and they 
will play a prominent role in the process of re-launching the Angolan agricultural sector. 
They believe that the occurrence of scenario 3 will result in a more efficient smallholder 
farming sector, and a more efficient smallholder farming sector will lead to higher 
productivity of resources, and the increase in overall production. Therefore, 
reinvigorating the smallholder farming sector will have a strong potential to increase 50 
 
aggregate production levels and gradually reduce food imports. In summary, the 
occurrence of scenario 3 will lay the foundation for the occurrence of scenario 1 in a 
complementary way. 
Table 3 also shows some provincial level group differences in participants’ 
perceptions regarding the probability of occurrence of each scenario. The provincial level 
group perceptions diverge mostly on scenario 4. In contrast to scenario 4, the participants 
are highly optimistic about the probability of the occurrence of scenarios 3 within the 
next five years. Bengo (Luanda green belt), perceives that scenario 4 has a minimal 
probability of occurrence. Malanje and Cabinda perceive the probability of occurrence of 
scenario 4 with moderation. The participants from Kwanza Sul perceive scenario 4 as 
having a high likelihood of occurrence. The provincial differences suggest that each 
province has different development needs and they will require different strategies and 
development approaches. The differences in perceptions may be attributed to three main 
factors: (i) the proximity of Bengo to Luanda, which is the center of decisions for the 
entire country and makes participants more optimistic about the future of Angola; (ii) 
provinces located further away from Luanda may reflect the development commitment 
demonstrated by each provincial government, versus the central government; (iii) the 
provincial level differences in participants’ perceptions suggest that the provinces have 
different development needs, therefore, they require different development strategies and 
approaches.  
In spite of the provincial level differences, the participants perceive the 
smallholder sector as a major contributor to the future of the development of agriculture 
in Angola. They believe that the development priority for Angola, within the next five 51 
 
years will have to focus on stimulating local production, become food self sufficient and  
gradually reduce food imports. Nonetheless, they caution that the production for import 
substitution should not preclude efforts towards targeting export niche markets. For 
example, banana and coffee “robusta amboim” which has received a contract promise of 
$275/ton bonus
7
In conclusion, the participants’ perceptions suggest that the re-launching of a 
vibrant Angolan agricultural sector will require a strategy that focuses on supporting 
scenario 3. However, the success of an agricultural development program will depend on 
a good mix of strategy options and development approaches. At the national level, the 
government will have a broad based agricultural development strategy. However, sub-
sets of strategy options and development approaches will be required at the regional level 
to take into account specific development needs of each region
 on top of its market value are two explicit examples of crops with 
promising export potential along with production for import substitution. However, they 
also stated that to help those two crops become exportable there has to be appropriate 
investments to overcome production and quality standards constraints. 
8
 
. The specificity of the 
sets of strategies and development approaches will be designed in accordance with each 
region’s cropping systems, and the target markets and conditions of accessibility to those 
markets.  
                                                 
7 Robusta amboim is a high quality coffee produced in Kwanza Sul. Unlike most robusta coffee, the robusta 
amboim has a flavor and aroma unique to it and awards it a higher commercial value than the Arabica 
coffee. However, current yields are approximately 150 kg/ha, making it difficult to meet the market 
demand. Therefore, the robusta amboim requires investment to improve productivity and investment in 
harvesting and drying techniques to keep the uniqueness of its aroma and flavor that make it a preferred 
coffee (phone interview with a senior official from the Kwanza Sul provincial delegation of “Instituto de 
Café de Angola-INCA”; Luanda, July 13, 07).    
8 Angola is divided into four main agro-ecological regions. Each region comprises four to five provinces.  52 
 
Table 3: Group Rating of Pre-test Perceptions About the Likelihood of Scenario 
Occurrence  
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1. Measure of provincial level groups’ perceptions about the likelihood of occurrence of each scenario:  
Highly probable: 1 ____; 2 ____; 3 _____; 4 ____; 5 ____ Highly improbable. 
2. Huambo was not included in the table. Because there were only 10 participants from Huambo, only two 
groups were formed and scenarios 2 an 3 were excluded from the discussion. 
  
4.2.1 Scenario Group Discussions About the Loss of the Country’s 
Agricultural Production Capacity  
According to the participants, various factors have accounted for the loss of 
Angola’s agricultural production capacity. However, they did not vary per scenario. 
Hence, the results will be discussed jointly across scenarios. The participants stated that 
the factors that impacted the production capacity the most included those related to 
production efficiency, institutional support, transportation and marketing: 
(i) Production efficiency: deficient farmers’ access to quality seeds and fertilizer; lack of 
access to modern agricultural technologies and limited technical capacity of farmers;  53 
 
(ii) Institutional support: lack of production incentives to smallholder farmers; deficient 
government agricultural development strategies; lack of integration of the various 
segments along the food supply chain; limited access to agricultural credit; limited 
technical capacity of agricultural schools, and research and extension services;  
(iii) Transportation and marketing: difficult access to markets, due to poor road 
conditions; lack of rural commercialization network; inadequate conditions for storage of 
perishable food commodities and limited food processing capacity.  
The participants perceive the transportation and marketing factors as the most critical 
factors. They argue that easy access to market facilitates the link between the rural and 
the urban centers and this link stimulates exchange of goods and services. They support 
their argument by stating that the increase in exchange of goods and services between the 
rural and the urban centers stimulate demand for support services, which in turn triggers 
production efficiency.  They further elaborated that the combination of those factors led 
the country into low productivity levels for most crops, low aggregate production levels, 
high production costs, and loss of competitiveness of locally produced food commodities.    
4.2.2 Scenario Group Discussions About Conditions Needed to Revitalize the 
Agricultural-led Economy 
 
4.2.2.1 The Perceived Role of the Government 
Once again, across all scenarios group discussions and participating provinces, it 
is perceived that Angola has adequate productive resources to become a major food 
exporter. However, they believe that to experience a process of reinvigorating the 
agricultural sector and help it move from a food deficit status to a surplus producer, there 
will have to be multiple interventions. The principal interventions perceived to be crucial 54 
 
to kick start the agricultural sector were those that have the potential to stabilize the rural 
areas. They emphasized massive investments in rural infrastructures, particularly roads, 
railways, schools, health posts, and the provision of potable water, as a means of 
stimulating rural development.  
Interviews with key informants (BDA, MINADER, Sonangol and ENDIAMA 
high rank officials) focused mostly on government policies. The key informants stated 
that the government is determined to promote agricultural development and that they 
need to adopt a more coordinated development approach and take a more pragmatic 
approach to institutional reform. They further suggested that the government needs to 
create functional institutions and efficient systems to support its current reconstruction 
agenda. The key informants also believed that the establishment of the BDA “Banco de 
Desenvolvimento de Angola
9
                                                 
9 The Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola (BDA) was created to stimulate private investments in food 
supply chains and the industry of building materials. Its capital comes from the national development fund, 
which comprises of 5% and 2% tax contributions from oil and diamonds respectively. The first year of 
operation will be a pilot intervention and the bank will finance investments that stimulate the establishment 
of supply chains of maize and beans in Kwanza Sul, Huambo, Bie and Benguela, and cotton in Kwanza Sul 
and Malanje. The bank will also finance technical assistance to agribusiness firms as part of its sustainable 
strategy. It will charge 8% interest rate in Kwanzas, the local currency (personal interview with a BDA 
senior official; Luanda, July 24, 07).  
” with the mandate to stimulate entrepreneurship in 
agriculture (including processing and technical assistance), demonstrates the 
government’s commitment to promote development. However, they believe that such 
commitment  needs to be complemented with institutional arrangements that lead to a 
more coherent development policy between the bank and the ministry of agriculture and 
rural development (they believe that the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development’ 
agenda lags behind BDA’s intended development strategies). Both the participants in 
roundtable discussions and the key informants, suggest that in addition to the government 
channeling more mineral resources to agriculture and other non-mineral sectors, the 55 
 
government should adequately equip research and education institutions, stimulate 
scientific investigation, stimulate investments in processing of agricultural produce, 
reduce food imports, create systems of incentives to agricultural production, create a 
system of insurance against crop losses and low commodity prices, institutionalize 
production subsidies and exonerate the import taxes on fertilizers and other agricultural 
inputs including farm machinery, and improve extension services and the coordination 
between extension and research. The round table discussions further revealed that to 
make credit and other institutional arrangements become instruments of economic growth 
and catalyst of sustainable development, there will also have to be a mechanism that 
allows more interaction between the government and other development agencies.  
4.2.2.2 The Perceived Role of NGOs 
 NGOs are perceived by participants primarily as providers of:  technical 
assistance to smallholder farmers, helping to build capacity of farmers and technicians to 
enable them to better face the development challenges; support to local administrations in 
the design of community development programs, establishing mechanisms of credit 
intermediation between farmers and banks; promotional materials to encourage public 
debate to improve citizens’ ability to influence policies; market research and helping the 
government to establish price information systems, and disseminating modern 
agricultural technologies and improved varieties of food crops. The participants 
perceived the role of NGOs beyond the agricultural sector and stated that the NGOs 
intervention can play a crucial role in fostering the development process in the post-war 
Angola. The participants explained that although the successful intervention during the 
relief period does not predetermine the types of activities of the NGOs within the next 56 
 
five years, it establishes a certain window of opportunity, particularly in relation to credit 
intermediation, identification of market opportunities and providing technical assistance 
to farmers.  
4.2.2.3 The Perceived Role of the Private Sector 
Both the key informants and the participants in the roundtable discussions suggest 
that the private sector should engage in activities that intensify production and increase 
productivity. They believe that the role of smallholder farmers, large scale producers and 
input suppliers are distinct, but all must work closer together to avoid scenario 4 
(Agricultural Decline Scenario). Specifically, they believe that smallholder farmers 
should expand their cultivated fields, adopt improved varieties, identify market 
opportunities to be able to produce and meet the market requirements as opposed to 
producing traditional subsistence crops and hope that the market absorbs it. The 
participants believe that to have a strong agricultural sector, the medium and large scale 
farmers should become more proactive in adopting modern agricultural technologies and 
making investment decisions that lead to more efficient production systems. They suggest 
that the role of the two farming sub-sectors must expand beyond their own production 
needs, to also be able to help smallholder farmers to access markets.  
In order for the agricultural sector to prosper, there has to be a dynamic input 
supply and output market system. The participants explained that input suppliers should 
provide farm inputs to smallholder farmers on credit as well as expand the distribution 
network to reach remote locations. In reference to access to agricultural credit, the 
participants suggest that the commercial banks should reform their institutions to make 
credit delivery more expeditious, develop financial products and credit packages specific 57 
 
to the rural areas, and participate in training sessions organized for producers, loan 
officers and intermediary institutions such as NGOs.  
4.2.3 Scenario Group Discussions Regarding Factors that Will Stabilize the 
Agricultural Sector 
The participants believe that despite an upward trend in the aggregate production 
level of the main food crops in the past four main harvesting seasons, productivity per 
unit of land cultivated is low for those crops. They argue that increases in aggregate 
production levels have resulted mainly from an expansion of cultivated areas as opposed 
to resulting from improved production practices. This is in line with the MINADER and  
USDA reports mentioned in preceding literature review paragraphs, and the situation is 
similar to the Mozambique case. They suggest that unless appropriate strategies are put in 
place, this trend will lead to short lived periods of production increases, followed by a 
sharp decline thereafter.  
The study revealed that the participants perceive the stabilization of the 
agricultural sector as a complex process and that they acknowledge that the stabilization 
will need government development policies that stimulate productivity increases and 
foster intersectoral links. It was noted that to speed up the development process in line 
with the growth opportunity offered by the stability of prices of diamonds and oil, Angola 
will require development strategies that focus on both backward and forward linkages. 
The backward linkages will represent a significant part of demand created by raising rural 
incomes and increasing demand for fertilizer and marketing services whereas the forward 
linkages will stimulate agro-processing and act as a growth engine and opportunity to 
substitute imports.  58 
 
The participants perceive the role of smallholder farmers  in the process of 
stabilizing the agricultural sector as critical because it encompasses the vast majority of 
rural families. Both the participants and the key informants argue that although 
smallholder farmers produce low yields and low quality products they are industrious and 
have a strong entrepreneurial spirit. Therefore, they should have access to investments 
that increase their chances to access quality inputs, adopt modern production technologies 
and improve their managerial capabilities.  
4.2.4 Scenario Group Discussions About the Development and Coordination of 
the Food Supply Chain              
Both the participants and the key informants believe that roads and railways are 
essential to connect farmers to markets, and stimulate production increases. They 
perceive good roads and functional railways as having strong potential to lower 
transportation costs, reduce delivery delays, improve consistency in supply and increase 
chances of financial viability of farm enterprises. However, they caution that good roads 
and railways need to be complemented with the adoption of improved varieties, technical 
capacity to meet food safety and quality standards, and investment policies that stimulate 
private investment in every node of the supply chain. They explained that an inefficient 
road and rail network creates a disincentive to invest in the Angolan food supply chain. 
Farmers (particularly the smallholders) become increasingly more vulnerable over time, 
not because they are unable to produce enough, but rather because they cannot manage 
the products short shelf-life and hence must sell their produce at the time when markets 
are flooded with products and prices are low. They suggest that the establishment and 
coordination of food supply chains require a combination of government support for 59 
 
private investments in agriculture, the establishment of adequate storage facilities 
(including cold storage), more efficient farming systems and improved capacity of 
farmers to generate higher profit margins. In addition, they argue that universities, the 
government and the farming industry should share the responsibility of training more 
managers for the country to have more skilled agribusiness managers. In addition, well 
trained development strategy technicians and agricultural policy analysts are needed.   
4.3 Pre-test Analysis 
4.3.1 Provincial and Institutional Representation   
The pre-test was administered to 122 participants, representing five provinces. Figure 
12 indicates that Kwanza Sul had the highest representation with 27.9% of the 
participants; followed by Malanje, with 26.2% of the participants; Cabinda, with 25.4% 
of the participants; while Luanda and Huambo represented 12.3% and 8.2% respectively.  
Of the 122 participants, 54.9% held managerial positions while the remaining 45.1% 






Figure 13 shows that 49.2% of the participants were farmers; 20.5% were government 
representatives; 15.6% NGOs representatives; 5.7% represented the informal sector; 
3.3% were input suppliers; 2.5% represented government officials who are also farmers. 
The university faculty, supermarkets,   bankers, and farmers who are also input suppliers 









4.3.2 Pre-test Perceptions About the Role of Diamonds and Oil Industries in 
Promoting Sustainable Development  
Figure 14 indicates that 51.4% of the participants strongly believe that more 
production of diamonds would promote sustainable development; 25.7% believe that it 
would not, while the remaining 23% are neutral. The figure further indicates that 64.5% 
of the respondents believe that more oil production would promote sustainable 
development; 14% believe it would not; while the remaining 21.5% had a neutral 
opinion.  
 
This study found that there is a negative relationship between resource abundance 
and economic performance. This finding is in line with findings from prior research by 
(Stevens, 2003). Table 4 illustrates that more production of diamonds has a negative 
correlation both with an integrated development agenda and with programs aimed at 62 
 
providing agricultural production incentives. The table also shows that more production 
of oil has a negative correlation with an integrated development agenda. The table further 
indicates that an increase in the production of diamonds is negatively correlated with 
programs that focus on investments in programs that are perceived to have an impact on 
poverty reduction programs, such as rural infrastructure and investments in smallholder 
agriculture. Similarly, the table shows that an increase in oil production is negatively 
correlated with programs that stimulate off-farm activities and programs that stimulate 
investment in smallholder agriculture.   
However, the table shows positive significant correlations between both more 
production of diamonds and more production of oil and investment in large scale 
commercial farmers and urban employment.  The positive and significant correlation 
between those variables illustrates that both the diamonds and the oil industries do not 
directly contribute to poverty reduction. This finding confirms findings from prior 
research by (Rosser, 2004) which found that the deindustrialization of a country’s 
economy when natural resources are discovered results in a large inflow of foreign 
currency, inducing an export boom and causing an appreciation in the country’s currency.  
The mineral booms have strong effects on the labor force; yet little is known about their 
ultimate impact on the distribution of income and poverty alleviation.  
During the round table discussions, the participants’ perception about the 
potential of the mineral sector to contribute to promoting sustainable development was 
related to the sector’s capacity to generate financial resources which, if properly utilized 
will give a strong impetus to the development of agriculture and contribute to sustainable 
development. This finding is in line with prior research by (Rosser, 2004) which indicates 63 
 
that other scholars suggest that economically successful resource rich countries have been 
able to break the resource curse because they have adopted radical and well coordinated 
economic policies, particularly in the macroeconomic and fiscal realms.   
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4.3.3 The Impact of Agricultural Development on Poverty Reduction 
Table 5 illustrates that the agricultural production incentives and the private 
investment in agriculture are significantly positively correlated with commercial and 
smallholder farmers’ investment. Similarly, private investment in agriculture is 
significant and positively correlated with both, investment in smallholder and large scale 64 
 
commercial farmers. The positive and significant relationships between those factors 
confirm participants’ perceptions that the reinvigoration of the agricultural sector within 
the next five years will need an investment in the smallholder sector and a strong private 
sector that invests in agriculture. The role of credit in the development of the agricultural 
sector is shown by the positive and significant relationships in the last row of table 5.  
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4.3.4 Perceptions about the Role of Agriculture in Promoting Sustainable 
Development 
The role of agriculture in promoting sustainable development was reaffirmed by 
94.8% of the respondents and the key informants interviewed. They believe strongly that 
agriculture has a great potential to contribute to the achievement of economic growth in 
Angola, while 2.6% believe it does not. The remaining 2.6% of the respondents had a 
neutral opinion.  65 
 
Figure 15 shows that 95% of respondents strongly believe that sustainable 
development will be best achieved through the award of agricultural production 
incentives; 86.3% believe strongly that it would be best achieved through private 
investment in agriculture; 87% strongly advocate for government subsidies to agricultural 
credit; while 82% believe strongly that an integrated development agenda
10
                                                 
10 Agriculture is key to the development of the Angolan economy. During colonial time the diamond 
company had agriculture programs aimed at ensuring regular supply of agricultural commodities to the 
cafeteria which served meals to hundreds of employees. Such programs allowed rural families to generate 
income thereby reducing poverty while at the same time the company did not have to rely on food imports 
(personal interview with senior official from ENDIAMA-a conglomerate of diamond exploration owned by 
the government of Angola; Luanda, July 22, 07).   The government should develop more coherent 
development programs and define intervention strategies that involve the private sector. The Angolan 
economy cannot rely only on oil to develop and sustain itself.   Agriculture is the foundation of life and 
everyone depends direct or indirectly on agriculture for their sustainable livelihoods. Therefore, there 
should be better coordinated strategies to have the country benefit from its high potential (personal 
interview with a senior official from SONANGOl-a conglomerate of oil exploration owned by the 
government of Angola; Luanda, July 26, 07).   
 would help to 
achieve sustainable development in Angola. Sustainable development in Angola will 
require translating economic growth into poverty reduction and improvement in standards 
of living of the population.  66 
 
 
Approximately 71% of the estimated 14 million Angolans rely on agriculture for 
their livelihoods. The participants in this study established a symbiotic relationship 
between elements of sustainable development and development approaches that impact 
poverty reduction. Ninety-four percent of the respondents strongly believe that the 
rehabilitation or construction of rural infrastructure will have a positive impact on 
poverty reduction, 93% strongly advocate for support to smallholder farmers. This belief 
illustrates that if smallholder farmers are given the right support to produce, easy access 
to market and transportation costs are low, the conditions will be conducive for 
smallholder farmers to increase production, generate surpluses and help Angola to 
gradually reduce its dependence on imported food. However, 88% of the respondents 
stress the need to invest in large scale farming as a means to impact poverty reduction, 
73% and 45% of respondents strongly believe that increasing urban employment and 67 
 
supporting investment in off-farm activities, respectively, will have a positive impact on 
poverty reduction.  
The informal sector attracts many customers because it offers an opportunity for 
interaction between the customer and the vendor, thereby allowing bargaining. The main 
incentive to entering the informal sector is that it has zero cost of entry and no delays to 
start business. The informal sector constitutes the single most important source of 
employment for Luanda and other main city dwellers in Angola and it functions as a 
convenient supply system. The informal sector will play a catalyst role in the 
development of Angola if it is not regulated to certain confinements, and it is allowed to 
compete with the emerging formal markets.   
4.3.5 Pre-test Perceptions About a Sustainable Agricultural Development 
Program   
Figure 16, indicates that 92% of the respondents strongly believe that to have a 
functional and sustainable agricultural development program in Angola, within the next 
five years, Angola needs to adopt strategies that focus primarily on production for import 
substitution.  Participants in this study verbally affirmed that within the next five years 
Angola can produce enough food to meet its internal food requirements, confirming 
scenario 1. This finding is in agreement with the scenario analysis discussion in the 
preceding sections, particularly with the positive and significant correlations shown in 
table 5. The participants explain that the agricultural production systems will not be 
sufficiently efficient enough to generate adequate surpluses for export within the next 
five years.  68 
 
Figure 16, shows also that 96% of the respondents strongly advocate for 
availability of agricultural credit, 93% argue strongly that to have a functional and 
sustainable agricultural development within the next five years there will have to be 
investments in research and extension, whereas the remaining 91% argue strongly that in 
addition to all other development factors, there will have to be a strong private sector 
interest in agricultural development to make an adequate investment.  
  Table 6 shows a positive correlation between the existence of a strong private 
sector and factors needed to stimulate sustainable food supply chains (training more 
agribusiness managers, more proactive informal markets, more privately owned 
supermarkets, higher farmers’ profits margins, greater production efficiency, better 
storage facilities, more government support to private investment, better coordination 
among donors and more government owned supermarkets). In addition, the table shows 
that the correlations between a strong private sector and the factors needed to stimulate a 69 
 
sustainable food supply chain in Angola are statistically significant at α=.05. The positive 
significance explains the important role the private sector is expected to play in the 
development of agriculture in Angola.   
Table 6: Pre-test Correlations for a Sustainable Agricultural Development Program 
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4.4 Comparative Analysis of the Pre and Post-test Results 
The objective of the pre- and a post-test was to assess changes in individual’s 
perceptions in relation to the future of Angola. The pre-test was administered to 
participants before their exposure to the scenario analysis session and the post-test was 
administered approximately three weeks after exposure to the scenario analysis. The 
analysis was based on t-tests for independent samples, repeated measures. The null 
hypothesis is Ho: the different treatments have no effect on participants’ perceptions, 
against the alternative hypothesis H1: the different treatments have an effect on the 
participants’ perceptions. The analysis was conducted on three provinces (Bengo-Luanda 
green belt, Kwanza Sul and Malanje). The other two provinces (Huambo and Cabinda) 
did not return the post-test surveys. The two provinces that did not return the post-test 
were discarded from this part of the comparative quantitative analysis using the t-test 
results. However, cross-tabulation and chi-square tests were used to test the level of 
significance of the two provinces on the results of the study. It was found that Cabinda 
and Huambo were not significantly different from Bengo-Luanda green belt, Kwanza Sul 
or Malanje (see Appendix 3 for the cross-tab results). Therefore, the results from the 
three provinces are representative of all five provinces statistically.   
4.4.1 The Test of Significance (T-test)   
The t-test was used to determine the level of significance of change in the 
participants’ perceptions, comparing the pre-test means and the post-test means. Those 
variables that are significantly different are: government subsidized agricultural credit; 
government action to promote development of the agricultural sector; crops that would 71 
 
give Angola a comparative advantage (cassava and Irish potatoes); and beef that would 
give Angola a comparative advantage.  
Three of the five variables with statistical significance are related to government 
actions. This shows that participants have high expectations regarding the government’s 
commitment to have actionable development strategies. This illustrates that the people 
have confidence in the government. However, the government is likely to face difficulties 
in meeting the high expectations, at this stage of rebuilding a country which has been 
devastated by approximately three decades of civil war. With an almost endless list of 
priorities, the government has limited resources and technical capacity to develop sound 
strategies. These results also raise concerns because heavy reliance on government to 
perform many of the development tasks may result in a retarded growth of the private 
sector, either because the government overplays its role or because prospective private 
entrepreneurs become excessively risk averse, a situation that would inhibit their ability 
to invest and grow.  
The other three variables that show statistical significance are cassava, Irish 
potatoes and beef. None of these were expected to be statistically significant because 
there has not been much genetic improvement done on those crops to elevate their 
production potential. Because their productivity has been far below the levels that would 
make their production cost-effective, they would require major investments to make them 
competitive on the international market. The increasingly high demand for Irish potatoes 
and beef has resulted in larger volumes of imported potatoes and beef. This scenario 
shows promising markets for those products, however, the Angolan entrepreneurs do not 
believe they can overcome the production constraints they currently face to produce 72 
 
efficiently and gradually become the main domestic suppliers of potatoes and beef. 
Cassava, on the other hand is a crop that is gaining increasingly more importance in the 
domestic market. The government and the NGOs have been promoting cassava 
processing initiatives with the aim of diversifying the range of products derived from 
cassava. However, the statistical significance of the negative direction of change in 
participants’ perceptions indicates that cassava is far from gaining economic importance 
beyond its traditional role of a food security safety net crop.         
Tables 7 through 14 provide summaries of group statistics and t-tests for equality 
of means, with equal variance and unequal variance. By virtue of their positive 
association with agricultural development, many variables were expected to have 
statistical significance, but most of them do not. The summaries below illustrate that 
there are several variables that did not experience a dramatic change, but remained 
important to the participants. Given that the rating scale was from 1 to 5, any variable that 
had a mean of 4.5 or higher could not experience a dramatic change in the post-test. On 
the other hand, since no variable was rated lower than 3.0, we were not concerned about 
changes to the lower end.  
The variables from question 1 which include: more production of diamonds; more 
production of oil; agricultural production incentives; private investment in agriculture and 
integrated development agenda (table 7) are not statistically significant. However, in spite 
of not being statistically significant, the variables private investment in agriculture and an 
integrated development agenda show a change in a positive. By contrast, the variables 
more production of diamonds and more production of oil, show a change in the opposite 
direction. This trend suggests that the participants’ perceptions about the potential for the 73 
 
mineral sector supporting economic development may have changed in favor of 
agriculture. This finding is consistent with the results of the scenario analysis, as 
illustrated in figure 13.  
Table 7: Group Statistics and T-test for Equality of Means: Question 1: Factors to 
Promote Sustainable Economic Development in Angola (see Appendix 3) 
  t-test for Equality of Means 










































































































































































*T-value is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** T-value significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 8 shows that variables from question 2 (approaches that would have an impact on 
poverty alleviation) which include: investment in rural infrastructure, support to rural off-
farm activities, investment in smallholder agricultural production, investment in large 
scale commercial farmers and income redistribution and urban employment were 
expected to be statistically significant, but they are not. The variables large scale 
commercial farmers and support to rural off-farm activities show a change in a positive 74 
 
direction. By contrast, the variables investment in rural infrastructure and investment in 
smallholder farmers show a change in the opposite direction. Off-farm was rated at 3.25 
in the pre-test and 3.36 in the post-test. The relatively low rating suggests that 
participants do not regard off farm activities as highly as agriculture. Its low importance 
relative to agriculture may be due to the fact that the more people engage in off farm 
activities, the fewer workers would be available for agriculture. The last row shows that 
the variable government taking actions to promote development of the agricultural sector 
is statistically significant and was discussed in the preceding section.    
Table 8: Group Statistics and T-test for Equality of Means; (Question 2: 
Development Approaches that Impact Poverty & Question 4: Government Taking 
Appropriate Action) (see Appendix 3) 
  T-test for Equality of Means 





































































































































































































*T-value is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** T-value significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 75 
 
 
Table 9 shows the variables from question 6 (establishment of sustainable supply chains) 
which include: more government support to private investment, more government owned 
supermarkets, better donor coordination, better storage facilities, more production 
efficiency, higher farmers profit margins, more privately owned supermarkets, more 
proactive informal sector and training more managers, all of which were expected to be 
statistically significant, but are not. The variables more government support to private 
investment, more privately owned supermarkets, more government owned supermarkets, 
better storage facilities, more proactive informal sector and training more managers show 
a change in a positive direction. By contrast, the variables better donor coordination, 
more production efficiency and higher farmers’ profit margins show a change in the 
opposite direction. These findings show that the study had a heterogeneous group of 
participants. One would expect the variables, more production efficiency and higher 
farmers’ profit margins to change to a positive direction; along with the variables training 
more managers and more proactive informal sector because together these variables are 
important to increasing employment, income generation and poverty reduction.  
In spite the importance of production efficiency and higher farmers’ profit margins in 
promoting a stable agricultural sector, participants’ perceptions may have been 
influenced by the approximately 17 years of a centrally planned economy, in which case 





  Table 9: Group Statistics and T-test for Equality of Means: Question 6: To 
Stimulate Sustainable Food Supply Chains (see Appendix 3) 
  T-test for Equality of Means 







































































































































































































































































































*T-value is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  




Table 10 provides the variables from question 7 (programs that would help 
Angola to have a functional and sustainable agricultural development strategy), which 
include: focus on production for export, focus on production for import substitution, 
availability of agricultural credit, strong private sector, strong private sector, 
strengthening agricultural schools, strengthening research and extension, better 
coordination between government and donors, all of which were expected to be 
statistically significant, but are not. The variables focus on production for export, focus 
on production for import substitution, availability of agricultural credit, strong private 
sector show a change in a positive direction and this finding is consistent with the results 
of scenario analysis in table 3. By contrast, the variables strong private sector, 
strengthening agricultural schools, strengthening research and extension, better 
coordination between government and donors show a change in the opposite direction. 
The variables that show changes in participants’ perceptions in a positive direction 
attribute high importance to the agricultural sector and reinforce Angola’s perceived 
strong agricultural potential. The results showing reduced importance of strengthening 
agricultural schools and research and extension services reflect the deficient coordination 
among the three institutions. The results further show that neither the research nor the 
extension services have been responsive to the needs of the farming communities. The 
coordination between the host government and donors may play a role in the 








Table 10: Group Statistics and T-test for Equality of Means: Question 7: Functional 
Agricultural Strategy (see Appendix 3) 
  T-test for Equality of Means 
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*T-value is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** T-value significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 11 shows variables from question 11 (Factors that would help improve current 
production levels), which include: roads and railways, input distribution system, 
agricultural technologies, development policies, market information systems, storage 
facilities, cold storage, pricing system and transportation costs, all of which were 
expected to be statistically significant, but are not. The variables roads and railways, 
input distribution system, agricultural technologies, development policies show a change 79 
 
in a positive direction. By contrast, market information systems, storage facilities, cold 
storage, pricing system and transportation costs, show a change in the opposite direction. 
The change of participants’ perceptions in the opposite direction shows some level of 
uncertainty about the efficiency of the government’s institutional reforms aimed at 
speeding up the process of business legalization, the potential of the newly established 
bank “BDA” to support agribusiness enterprises and the ability of the government to 
















                                                 
11 The uncertainty is a result of past experience with government development programs. The government 
created the “Caixa da Agro-pecuária e Pescas (CAP),  Fundo de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Agricola 
(FADA), Fundo de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (FDES), with the mandate to support 
the re-launching of the agricultural sector. However, with exception of the latter that is believed to have 
been replaced by the BDA, the other two failed to meet the objectives and succumbed to mismanagement.  80 
 
Table 11: Group Statistics and T-test for Equality of Means: Question 11: Factors to 
Improve Production (see Appendix 3) 


























































































































































































































































































*T-value is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** T-value significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 12 shows variables from question 12 (Factors that would help smallholder 
farmers increase productivity), which include: Input handouts , training, functional input 
retail system, access to farm machinery, functional price system, access to credit, 
integrated marketing system, irrigation and better land tenure, all of which were expected 81 
 
to be statistically significant, but are not. The variables input handouts, access to farm 
machinery, functional information system, integrated marketing systems, and better land 
tenure show a change in a positive direction. By contrast, variables the training, 
functional input retail system, access to credit and irrigation show a change in the 
opposite direction. The variables that show change in participants’ perceptions in the 
opposite direction are those that have constituted the core of NGOs interventions over the 
past 15 years. The participants may have down played the variables, because they know 
the services already exist or, alternatively, because they have not seen tangible results 
















Table 12: Group Statistics and T-test for Equality of Means: Question 12: Factors to 
Help Smallholder Farmers Increase Productivity (see Appendix 3) 
  T-test for Equality of Means 































































































































































































































































































*T-value is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** T-value significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 13 shows variables from question 17 (Crops and meats that would give Angola a 
comparative advantage in international trade), which include: cassava, potatoes,  83 
 
carrots, tomato, and beef, all of which were expected to be statistically significant, but not 
all of them are.  Contrary to the expected positive change in participants’ perceptions, the 
four crops and beef show changes in the opposite direction. Cassava, potatoes and beef 
show dramatic changes and are statistically significant, as discussed above. Carrots and 
tomatoes show a less dramatic change hence are not statistically significant. The negative 
change in participants’ perceptions regarding the importance of carrots and tomatoes can 
be attributed to their production seasonality nature and the uncertainty caused by the 
challenge agribusiness entrepreneurs face to find cultivars that allow year round 































Table 13: Group Statistics and T-test for Equality of Means: Question 17: Crops 
and Beef that give Angola a Comparative Advantage (see Appendix 3) 
  T-test for Equality of Means 
















































































































































*T-value is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** T-value significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 14 shows variables from question 18 (Importance of informal market to the 
Angolan economy), which include: overall economic growth of the country, rural 
economy, urban economy, agricultural sector, marketing of fresh fruits and marketing of 
vegetables, all of which were expected to be statistically significant, but are not. Overall 
economic growth of the country, rural economy, urban economy and marketing of 
vegetables show changes in a positive direction. The variable agricultural sector and 
marketing of fresh fruits show a change in the opposite direction.  
The informal market is the single most important marketing channel for fruits and 
vegetables in Angola. It regulates prices in response to demand for goods and services 
and the supply response. It offers rural families an economic opportunity that formal 
markets do not because contrary to formal market channels that procure mostly from 
nearby sites to reduce costs and pay for goods between 30-90 days after product has been 
delivered, the informal market reaches further out in search for produce, it pays for goods 
promptly upon purchase and they bear the transportation costs. From consumer’s end, in 
many instances the informal market is preferred because it functions a network of 
convenience stores that operate for longer hours and allow human interaction that formal 
markets do not. Thus, in spite the fact that in some instances consumers pay higher prices 
in informal markets than in formal markets, consumers do not readily notice the 
difference in prices for two reasons: the unit of measurement is such that consumers can 
purchase small quantities as needed and they do not notice that are paying more that what 
they would if purchased in kilos; the human interaction adds an important dimension to 
the business because customers discuss prices and can ask for exchange of product units 
for  better quality.        86 
 
Table 14: Group Statistics and T-test for Equality of Means: Question 18: 
Importance of Informal Market to the Angolan Economy (see Appendix 3) 
  T-test for Equality of Means 














































































































































































































*T-value is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** T-value significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Remember that the rating scale was from 1 to 5, any variable that had a mean of 
4.5 or higher could not experience a dramatic change in the post-test. Those variables that 
remained strongly important (4.5 or higher) were: (i) private investment in agriculture, 
investment in smallholder farmers, smallholder access to credit, investment in large scale 
farmers and agricultural potential; (ii) government support to private investments, 
agricultural production incentives, strengthening agricultural schools, roads and railways, 
agricultural technologies, availability of agricultural credit, government subsidized 
agricultural credit, (iii) access to farm machinery, more production efficiency, better 87 
 
storage facilities, training more managers, focus on production for import substitution, a 
strong private sector, and cassava.  
The participants’ perceptions revealed a bi-modal distribution in the post-test. 
Interestingly, both modes increased in average indicating that the participants had divided 
perceptions in relation to most variables. The bi-modal behavior of the distribution was 
an indication that even though many of the variables that were expected to be statistically 
significant are not, and that was due in part to the fact that all variable were perceived 
highly important in the pre-test and remained important in the post test.  The scenario 
analysis had an effect on the participants’ perceptions but the measurement approach 
could not capture the changes to show statistical significance.   
4.5 Recommended Agricultural Strategy Options 
In response to the post-independence agricultural sector crisis, the pro-socialist Angolan 
government resorted to confiscation of all formally Portuguese owned farms and 
converted them into state owned enterprises, created state owned companies that 
delivered inputs to farmers (including access to farm machinery), purchased agricultural 
output, and farmers were organized into cooperatives.   In addition, the government 
established trading companies in an attempt to remedy the collapse of rural trade. 
However, all of the following led to the breakdown of the agricultural sector in the post-
independence period: there was a massive influx of rural families into urban centers due 
to the severity of the civil conflict; the agricultural sector was neglected which was the 
result of inadequate planning; there was institutional inefficiencies of the trading 
companies; and weak managerial and technical skills of the post-independence 
agricultural development planners. 88 
 
The implementation of a development strategy requires a clear formulation of a 
conducive policy and institutional environment, a widely shared consensus about the 
strategy and its targets, and the human capacity and sufficient financial resources.  
Angola’s resource abundance will be a blessing to the country if the government 
combines oil and diamond revenues allocation to the development of the agricultural 
sector with appropriate development strategies, including macroeconomic policy reforms 
that discourage overvaluation of the local currency.    
Abdullahi (1985), Ijere (1986), Kyle (1997) and Ross (2003) consider Nigeria an 
example of an oil-rich country that has failed to promote sustainable economic 
development, albeit its enormous natural resource base. The failure of Nigeria to promote 
sustainable economic development stemmed essentially from the lack of a development 
strategy that puts an emphasis on agricultural investment coupled with an exchange rate 
policy designed to avoid over-appreciation (Kyle 1997).   This finding is in line with 
prior research by (Rosser, 2004) which indicates that other scholars suggest that 
economically successful resource rich countries have been able to break the resource 
curse because they have adopted radical and well coordinated economic policies, 
particularly in the macroeconomic and fiscal realms.  This analysis prompts an 
opportunity for Angola to consider lessons from Nigeria and other countries before 
pursuing economic development strategies.   
The government, the private sector, the donor community and the NGOs face the 
joint challenge of rethinking future agricultural development strategies and making them 
more in line with specific natural resources endowments, the socio-economic, cultural 
and cropping systems of each region.     89 
 
In order to select possible alternatives within each scenario, it was necessary to 
establish a set of assumptions about the current socio-economic conditions of the 
infrastructure, past development approaches pursued by mineral rich countries and the 
information gathered in the course of this study. These assumptions are: (i) the 
government is going to take appropriate actions to promote the development of the 
agricultural sector; (ii) the rehabilitation of roads and the railways will be completed 
within the next five years; and (iii) the Angolan smallholder farmers have a strong 
entrepreneurial spirit and they can take advantage of development opportunities, as they 
arise.  
Scenario 3; “Renaissance of a Productive Smallholder Farming Sector,” was 
determined to be the most likely to occur within the next five years. Scenario 1; “Jump-
Start Strategy for Stable Growth,” was the most desired to occur within the next five 
years. Scenario 2; “Export Oriented Production,” was perceived to be equally likely to 
occur as scenario 1, but it was not discussed as extensively during the scenario analysis.    
Scenario 4; “Agricultural Decline Scenario,” was the least desired to occur within the 
next five years.  
Based on current socio-economic conditions of the infrastructure, past development 
approaches pursued by mineral rich countries, the opinions of the key informants and the 
122 participants in this study, the following is recommended for the development of the 




4.5.1 Strategy Option 1: Investment in Smallholder Farming Sector to Promote 
the Renaissance of a Productive Smallholder Farming Sector. 
The main components of this strategy option include:  investment in small and large 
scale irrigation systems; creation of systems that expedite agricultural credit delivery, 
adoption of modern agricultural technologies; use of quality inputs (high yielding 
varieties and fertilizer); easy access to markets (rehabilitation of roads); and food 
processing enterprises and storage facilities (particularly cold storage). This strategy 
option will lead to the strengthening of the smallholder farming sector. Because 
smallholder farmers constitute the backbone of the Angolan agricultural sector and 
they have a strong entrepreneurial spirit, this strategy option will result in more 
efficient agriculture production systems, higher productivity of resources, dramatic 
increases in production levels and the stabilization of the agricultural sector, all of 
which will lead to gradually reducing food imports.       
The study has identified some key roles for the private sector, the government and 
the NGOs. Although the roles of those institutions are not mutually exclusive, they 
are listed as follows: 
  (i) the NGOs will be required to identify sources of improved genetic material 
(seeds or other planting materials), packaging material; (ii) the NGOs will be required 
to help with the identification of domestic market opportunities, help develop 
business relationships between producers and input/output market operators; (iii) the 
government and the NGOs will be expected to help farmers establish strong 
cooperatives (cooperatives that create mechanisms for providing technical assistance 
to their members as well as to farming communities in general and become strong 91 
 
representatives of farmers’ interests); (iv) the NGOs and the government will be 
expected to provide technical assistance to smallholder farmers; (v) the NGOs will be 
required to assist farmers with post harvest handling preservation (to ensure regularity  
and consistency of supplies; (vi) the NGOs and the government will need to work 
with the banking sector in the development of more diversified financial services; 
(vii) the supermarkets will be expected to improve purchasing and payment 
mechanisms and assist smallholder farmers access quality seeds; (viii) the input 
suppliers will be required to make inputs available in a timely manner and at 
competitive prices; (ix) the smallholder farmers will be required to adopt modern 
agricultural techniques and appropriate crop husbandry practices to improve yields 
and quality; and (x) the government will be expected to rebuild roads and the railways 
to ensure easier access to markets. 
  Provincial level recommendations are given due to the fact that each province has 
some specific needs and concerns.  
Bengo-Luanda green belt 
•  Access to farm equipment 
•  Regular technical assistance in production, quality standards and marketing  
 
Cabinda   
•  Approaching the government to stimulate political will to promote the occurrence 
of this scenario  
•  Training and capacity building of entrepreneurs involved in the food supply chain 
•  Better access to land and irrigation water 92 
 
Kwanza Sul 
•  Technical assistance in production, quality standards and marketing 
•  Better access to arable land and quality seed 
•  Training smallholder farmers in agribusiness management 
Malanje 
•  Establishment of banks in all locations with high agricultural potential 
 
•  Organize rural commercialization systems 
•  Technical assistance to farmers for production and quality standards 
If for unforeseeable reasons Angola is not able to accomplish strategy option 1 which is 
similar to scenario 3, the second best approach would be to follow a strategy that leads to 
either scenario 1 or scenario 2.  
4.5.2 Strategy Option 2: Investment in Medium and Large Scale Agriculture to 
Either Jump-Start and Stabilize the Growth of Agricultural Sector or Promote an 
Export Oriented Production.  
The key components of this strategy option include: investment in roads and rail 
ways; large scale irrigation systems; government farmer support programs; easy access to 
markets; investment in education, research and extension; investment in market 
information and investment in storage facilities, particularly cold storage. This strategy 
option will stimulate the quick development of efficient food supply chains. Strategy 
option 2 will result in Angola quickly penetrating international agricultural markets and 
generating more foreign currency for the country. It will also create more jobs for rural 
populations. However, since medium and large scale commercial farmers will focus 
mostly on production of export cash crops, this strategy option will not directly contribute 93 
 
to the stabilization of food security. On the other hand, since farm labor wages tend to be 
among the lowest, when compared to other jobs, this strategy will not have a dramatic 
impact on poverty reduction.    
This study has identified some key roles for the private sector, the government and 
the NGOs. Although the roles of those institutions are not mutually exclusive, they are 
listed as follows:   
(i) the NGOs will be required to identify sources of improved genetic material (seeds 
or other planting materials), packaging material and equipments such as cold storage and 
processing units; (ii) the NGOs will be required to help with the identification of market 
opportunities both within and outside the country, help develop business relationships 
between producers and input/output market operators; (iii) the government will be 
expected to adopt policies that expedite discharge of inputs from customs, exonerate 
taxes on imported agricultural inputs and repair the roads and the railways; (iv) the 
government and the NGOs will be expected to jointly provide technical assistance to 
farmers to help them adopt improved agricultural techniques and modern crop husbandry 
practices; (v) the medium and large scale farmers will be expected to invest in post-
harvest techniques including cold storage facilities and develop marketing strategies that 
ensure regularity and consistency of supply; and (vi) the supermarkets may identify 
sources of improved genetic material for the quality standards they demand and help 
producers access the material.         
  Because at the provincial level the needs and concerns are different, the following 
set of specific recommendations is provided:  
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•  Better exchange systems between the rural and the urban areas 
•  Investment in appropriate technologies 
•  Decentralization of public services 
•  Subsidies to agriculture (crops and livestock) to safeguard against calamities  
•  Build stronger links between research, education and the farming community 
•  Increase investment in agricultural production systems 
Bengo-Luanda green belt 
•  Irrigation  
•  Mechanized agriculture 
•  Technical assistance in staggered production, quality standards and marketing 
•  Development of human capacity 
Cabinda 
•  Permanent rural commerce  
•  Assurance of high technology 
•  Support with equipment 
•  Internal as well as external output markets 
•  Investment in preservation and processing 
Kwanza Sul 
•  Political stability, holding elections and acceptance of the outcome by all political 
actors and the international community 
•  Industrialization and mechanization of agriculture 
•  The combination of adequate government development policies, access to 
agriculture, and the establishment of functional food supply chains 95 
 
•  With increasing revenues from oil and diamonds, to serve as a source of capital to 
finance agriculture and other activities 
 
Malanje 
•  Creation of conditions that stimulate the return of populations to rural areas 
•  Implementation of appropriate development policies 
•  Adoption of modern agricultural technologies 
Bengo-Luanda green belt 
•  High quality production and regularity in supplies 
•  Adoption of production technologies that lead to increased productivity 
•  Research become better able to solve production problems 
•  Farmers organized in cooperatives and associations 
Cabinda  
•  Foreign as well as local investment in agricultural production systems  
•  Establish infrastructures (green houses, food processing industries and food 
preservation units) 
•  Training farmers in production, quality standards and marketing  
Kwanza Sul 
•  Reduction of production costs (make production systems more efficient) 
•  Availability of factors of production in a timely fashion, and adapted to the reality 
•  Availability of agricultural research and education   
Malanje 
•  Stimulate the establishment of small scale agro-processing industries 96 
 
•  Since diamonds and oil are the primary sources of revenues, it would be 
appropriate to have 25-30% of the revenues invested in the development of the 
agricultural sector 
•  Enable small and medium scale farming sector to have means of food 
preservation of perishable commodities green houses and silos, to ensure product 
quality for exports     
There is a need to make a coordinated effort by all institutions involved in the 
agribusiness field to avoid the occurrence of the least desired scenario 4. However, if in 
spite of government commitment, private sector determination to invest in agriculture, 
and donor community support, Angola merges into scenario 4, the alternative will be the 
adoption of strategy option 3.  
4.5.3 Strategy Option 3: Investment in a Program that Mitigates the Impact 
of Discrimination Against the Agricultural Sector.  
This is a strategy option aimed at mitigating the impact of a neglected agricultural 
sector. It will require greater degree of institutional arrangements and coordination of 
efforts to accomplish tangible results. The key interventions under this strategy option 
will be those interventions that have a strong potential to empower smallholder farmers to 
establish more effective production systems, and sensitize the government, the private 
sector and the donor community that the smallholder agricultural sector in Angola can be 
prosperous and contribute to the establishment of a more sustainable economic 
development program.  
The NGOs will be required to play a major role in connecting smallholder 
farmers, input suppliers, the banking sector the informal and the formal market channels. 97 
 
These institutional arrangements will help private sector to better understand the needs of 
the smallholder farming sector, thereby helping the sector to address constraints to 
realizing its production potential in a cost-effective manner.    
Smallholder farmers’ access to credit will play a key role in enabling those 
farmers to make more meaningful capital investment on their farms. However, 
smallholder farmers lack assets to meet the commercial banks formal lending 
requirements. There has been some level of donor funding for the purchase of equipment 
to promote more efficient agricultural marketing by smallholder farmers. Therefore, one 
alternative to overcoming the limited capacity of smallholder farmers to meet the lending 
requirements and qualify for productive loans is to allow farmer cooperatives to convert 
assets purchased with donor funds into cooperatives’ assets and use them as collateral 
against cooperative members borrowing.  
Key interventions under this strategy option will include programs that promote 
easier access of farmers to modern agricultural technologies, introduction of short 
maturing, improved varieties of food crops, agricultural credit intermediation, helping 
farmers to form strong cooperatives in order to do strong advocacy for collective needs 
such as easier access to agricultural credit, bulk purchase and benefit from price discounts 
collective hiring of farm machinery and tracks to reduce the cost related to land 
preparation and transportation of agricultural produce to market.  
The study has identified some key roles for the private sector, the government and 
the NGOs. Although the roles of those institutions are not mutually exclusive, they are 
listed as follows:  98 
 
   (i) the NGOs will be required to have more effective  credit intermediation 
programs, including the establishment of credit guarantee funds with commercial banks; 
(ii) the NGOs and the Government will be required to help build stronger farmers’ 
cooperatives to enable bulk purchasing and benefit from price discounts; (iii) the 
extension services and the NGOs will be required to promote more adoption of high 
yielding short maturing varieties, to ensure consistency and regularity in supplies; (iv) the 
Government will be required to adopt policies that exonerate taxes on importation of 
agricultural inputs; (v) the input suppliers will be required to reach out more farmers and 
make inputs available in time.  
At provincial level there will be a need for a more pragmatic response using 
approaches that include: 
Huambo 
•  Invest oil revenues in agriculture  
•  Invest in human capital development 
•  Adoption of participative governance 
•  Regularity of the democratic process 
•  A strong and dynamic civil society 
•  Strengthening institutional capacity of local administrations 
Bengo-Luanda green belt 
•  Efficient marketing network (supply of means of production and 
commercialization of agricultural products, including livestock) 
•  Easier farmers access to land  
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•  Oil revenues channeled to the agricultural sector 
•  Rehabilitation of rural infrastructure 
•  Conceive agriculture as a priority sector (prioritizing local food 
production) 
•  Advocate for introduction of modern technologies 
•  Create conditions of easy access to markets 
Kwanza Sul 
•  Invest in the establishment of food supply chains 
•  Need to create jobs in rural areas 
•  Improvement of conditions of living in rural areas (rehabilitation of rural 
infrastructure) 
•  Design programs aimed at combating poverty in rural areas 
•  Subsidies for means of production 
Malanje 
•  Make available agricultural inputs 
•   Subsidies for factors of production 
•  Develop agricultural programs that address poverty reduction  











The methodology used for this study was scenario analysis, based on a modified 
framework that results from a combination of Lyford et al. (2002), “A Framework for 
Industry Strategic Planning and Coordination (ISPC)” and “The Technological Demands 
Determination by Prospective Analysis”, by The Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Cooperation (EMBRAPA). The scenario analysis was effective in engaging key players 
in an interactive discussion to identify common problem areas, potential development 
opportunities and possible solutions to the agricultural industry problems. The scenario 
analysis was an effective way of initiating communication among the various participants 
in the food supply chain. This communication may lead to the adoption of better 
coordination of development efforts among institutions and facilitate the identification of 
institutional roles that improve the efficiency of the food supply chain.   
As a result of the scenario analysis and interviews with key informants, the study 
revealed that Angola has an enormous agricultural potential to become a major food 
exporter and one of the richest countries in Africa. However, in spite of its great 
agricultural potential, to be able to produce food for export markets, Angola will first 
need to address her institutional and structural agricultural development constraints and 
adopt approaches that allow better coordination of development efforts among 
institutions.  101 
 
Current production levels for the main food crops were characterized as low in the 
provinces where the study was conducted. It was found that the factors that accounted the 
most for Angola’s loss of production capacity over the years were related to: 
(i) Production efficiency: deficient farmers’ access to quality seeds and fertilizer; 
lack of access to modern agricultural technologies; limited technical capacity of farmers;  
(ii) Institutional support: lack of production incentives to smallholder farmers; 
deficient government agricultural development strategies; lack of integration of the 
various segments  along the food supply chain; limited access to agricultural credit; 
limited technical capacity of agricultural schools, research and extension services;  
(iii) Transportation and market access: difficult access to markets, due to poor 
road conditions; lack of rural commercialization network; inadequate conditions for 
storage of perishable food commodities and limited food processing capacity. 
The scenario analysis revealed that the revitalization of an agricultural-led 
economy will require multiple and coordinated interventions. Since smallholder farmers 
are the vast majority of the Angolan population, in stabilizing the rural areas, small 
farmers will play a critical role in the revitalization of an agricultural-led economy. To 
accomplish the goal of revitalizing the agricultural-led economy, there will be a need for 
massive investments in rural infrastructure, particularly the roads and railways; schools; 
health posts; and provision of potable water, to create the basis for rural development and 
create an incentive for rural families to remain in their villages.  
With regard to factors needed to stabilize the agricultural sector, the study 
revealed that in spite of an upward trend noticed in the aggregate production levels of the 
main food crops in the past four main harvesting seasons, productivity per unit of land 102 
 
cultivated remained below production capacity. It was found that the increases in 
aggregate production levels have resulted primarily from the expansion of cultivated 
areas, as opposed to resulting from improved production practices. The stabilization of 
the agricultural sector will require government policies that stimulate productivity 
increases and foster intersectoral links.  
The success of the agricultural stabilization process will depend, to some degree, 
on investments that promote easier access of smallholder farmers to quality inputs, 
opportunities for them to adopt modern production technologies and improve their 
managerial skills.  
The study also revealed that the development and coordination of food supply 
chains will depend largely on the reestablishment of the road and railway network 
because these infrastructures will help to lower transportation costs, reduce delivery 
delays, improve consistency in supply and increase the chance of financial viability of 
farm enterprises. However, it was noted that the reestablishment of good roads and a 
functional railway network will need to be complemented with adoption of improved 
varieties, the development of technical capacity to meet food safety standards, 
government policies that stimulate private investment in every node of the food supply 
chain and the development of human capacity to address development policy and 
agribusiness management issues.  
The study also found that each province has different development needs; to have a 
successful program of revitalization of the agricultural sector, there will have to be region 
specific strategies that address the provinces’ needs and support the government’s broad-
based country-wide agricultural development strategy.  103 
 
The scenario analysis was an effective methodology in engaging key players in an 
interactive dialogue for identification of institutional complementary roles in the process 
of revitalizing the agricultural sector in Angola and gradually build consensus among 
partners about development priorities. The process of building consensus among partners 
has been initiated and it is intended to build trust among the various actors, foster 
working relationships that help visualize potential gains from well coordinated 
development actions from all segments of the supply chain.  
Angola’s resource abundance will be a blessing to the country if the government 
combines oil and diamond revenues allocation to the development of the agricultural 
sector with appropriate development strategies, including macroeconomic policy reforms 
that discourage overvaluation of the local currency.    
 (Rosser, 2004) research indicates that other scholars have suggested that 
economically successful resource rich countries have been able to break the resource 
curse because they have adopted radical and well coordinated economic policies, 
particularly in the macroeconomic and fiscal realms.  
The government, the private sector, the donor community and the NGOs face the 
joint challenge of rethinking future agricultural development strategies and making them 
more in line with specific natural resources endowments, the socio-economic, cultural 
and cropping systems of each agro-ecological region of Angola.     
5.2 Further Research 
Research on agriculture development strategies has focused primarily on surveys 
and case studies to analyze food security status of developing nations. A wealth of 
research findings indicates that in spite of massive foreign investment channeled to 104 
 
agricultural development programs and the adoption of a variety of development 
strategies, developing countries in general, and resource-abundant countries in particular, 
have failed to develop agricultural production systems that lead to the realization of their 
potential. It is argued that natural resource abundance increases the risk of poor economic 
performance, which in turn leads to higher poverty rates. However, relatively little 
attention has been given to understanding why these resource-abundant developing 
countries have failed. Some questions, which arise from these observations, and require 
further research, are: (i) the results of agriculture’s contribution to economic growth 
caused by inappropriate strategies or by domestic and international agricultural policies? 
or (ii) is it the case that developing countries need to develop a “new agriculture 
paradigm” based on niche markets and agro-processing?  
Based on the experience of this field study there are two main adjustments that 
should be considered in future research on Angola.  First, the use of scenario analysis is 
useful to illicit problems and identify solutions. However, in order to make the study 
more effective in terms of its ability to effect changes in participants’ perceptions, future 
research should conduct the scenario analysis in two days particularly when there is a 
wide variation in participants education levels.   Second, future research should consider 
administering an exit qualitative test to capture individual evaluation of the effectiveness 
of scenario analysis in effecting people’s perceptions because it became apparent in this 
study that assessing peoples’ perceptions in a single day exposure to scenario analysis is 
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 Emerging from 27 Years of Civil War: Developing Strategy Options for Re-
launching a Vibrant Angolan Agricultural Sector 
 
Roundtable Discussion for Scenario Analysis 
Good morning, my name is Gomes Cambuta and I am conducting this research with the 
main objective of creating development strategy options that lead to a quick recovery and 
the development of a vibrant agriculture sector in Angola. More specifically, this research 
will lead to the following results:  
i.  determine factors that have contributed to the loss of the country’s agricultural 
production capacity;  
ii.  determine factors needed to jump start the agricultural economy; 
iii.  determine factors that can help stabilize the agricultural sector, and  
iv.  determine conditions required for the development and coordination of the 
food supply chain.            
I would like to ask you some questions. All data will be treated as confidential and be 
kept in a secure location by the researchers. Moreover, we note that no information about 
individual business units will be reported in any research publications.  
 
   Beginning of the Roundtable Session 
 
II. Statement of current situation of the agricultural sector  
Angola needs to have the right investments in the production of inputs, appropriate 
technologies and human capital to realize a dramatic increase in production and 
productivity. To make appropriate investment, the development practitioners and policy 
makers will be required to look forward and contribute with their skills, innovation, 
creativity and resources. The Angolan farming sector faces many constraints and 
uncertainties. However, this research will focus on identification of the most critical 
uncertainties, and identification of opportunities in order to develop strategy options 
guided towards a less uncertain agricultural development future and capable of taking 
advantage of development opportunities. The research will conduct an analysis of four 
distinct, but interrelated agricultural development scenarios, based on potential impact of: 
government development plans; imports and exports of agricultural commodities; support 
to large versus smallholder farmers; adoption of production technologies; access to 
agricultural credit; and supply chains, on agricultural production capacity of the country, 
over a five-year timeframe (2007 to 2012). Angola has abundant resources that can lead 
to a rapid and sustainable economic development. However, the country faces many 
constraints both from the supply and demand sides. From the supply side, the main 
constraints the country faces are poor rural infrastructure including poor road conditions; 
non-functioning rail ways; limited access to modern agricultural technology and technical 
assistance; reliance on low yielding degenerated cultivars; limited access to agricultural 
inputs; limited access to agricultural credit; limited coordination between agricultural 
schools and research, and between the two institutions and farmers; limited cadre of 
qualified agricultural technical staff; limited coordination among supply chain 
participants, and lack of an efficient market information system.  
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With the end of the civil war, the country is gradually gaining favorable conditions for 
foreign investment and tourism. Both foreign investment and tourism are believed to 
stimulate demand for goods and services. However, the agricultural sector can only 
produce enough to meet higher demand for locally produced food if the right investments 
are made in the production of inputs, appropriate technologies and human capital to 
realize a dramatic increase in production and productivity.   
 
III. Roundtable Discussions for Five Years (2007- 2012) Scenario Analysis in Sub-
groups 
 
Scenario 1: Jump-Start Strategy for Stable Growth  
As we look at the Angola’s agriculture of 2012, we see that all or  at least most 
development constraints were addressed. Over the last five years: Peace prevailed; oil 
prices either remained stable or were on the rise; and the production of diamonds 
increased significantly. The government adopted economic development policies that 
emphasized overcoming major constraints to agricultural production and decided to 
emphasize the role of agricultural development in promoting sustainable economic 
development. As part of its assurance of development commitment, the government: 
repaired the road network and restored the railways; it introduced major institutional 
changes to make research and education more responsive to the needs of the farming 
community; it created an enabling macroeconomic environment for private investment in 
agriculture.  The government also created an enabling environment for the establishment 
of functional markets and production incentives. The government, the civil society in 
general and the private sector made significant investments in rural infrastructures such 
as: health posts, schools, potable water, and communications. The government and the 
private sector made considerable investments in research and human resources 
development to permit human capital accumulation along with technical innovation. The 
banks have gained confidence in Angolan entrepreneurs; therefore, there has been easier 
access to credit for agricultural production, processing and storage. More efficient supply 
chains have been established to ensure satisfactory business transactions between farmers 
and retailers. As a result of these investments: skilled farm laborers who had left the rural 
areas in search for better standards of living, returned to the planalto, and other parts of 
the country; there is considerable private investment in off-farm businesses in the rural 
areas; markets across the country function without major distortions; transportation 
systems become more competitive and transportation costs decrease. As a result of 
improved production technologies and more efficient production systems, agricultural 
production is more efficient and more cost-effective. Therefore, for the past few years 
there have been enough production surpluses of food crops to meet domestic demand. In 
addition, there has been adequate surplus of a few selected commodities that Angola has 
a comparative advantage to produce for export markets. Appropriate government actions 
to stimulate agricultural development strategies, combined with private entrepreneurship 
have resulted in stronger agricultural production systems at both smallholder and large 
commercial farming sectors and have restored a sustainable food security system and 




In summary: The combination of appropriate government development policies, access 
to modern production technologies, improved access to credit and the establishment of 
functional supply chains have all played a critical role in promoting a jump-start and 
stable growth of the agricultural sector. The large commercial farming sector realized 
significant growth. The smallholder farming sector realized comparatively less growth, 
but has proved to have the potential to grow and become a profitable business. The 
millions of rural families whose livelihoods depend on agriculture have regained hope as 
prosperous farmers and gradually can see their expectations met. 
 
Roundtable discussion leading questions: 
Round 1 
1. What aspects of this scenario can be expected to reflect the future of the 
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b) Smallholder commercial farmers; 
 
 
c) Medium and large scale farmers;  
 
d) Formal markets; 
 
 
e) Informal markets;  
 
 
f) Input supply retail system; 
 
 
g) Commercial banks;  
 
 
5. How likely is this scenario to occur (please rate your perceptions from 1 to 5, 1 
being the least probable and 5 the most probable)?  
 
Highly probable: 1 ____; 2 ____; 3 _____; 4 ____; 5 ____ Highly improbable 
 
 





7. Assuming you support the occurrence of this scenario, what would you 








Scenario 2:  Export Oriented Production    
With its favorable climatic conditions and abundant and diversified natural resource base, 
Angolan agriculture of 2012 has returned to its historical position of a net exporter of 
agricultural commodities. Angola had an advantage compared to some other African 
countries, with respect to making a choice between promoting food crops or the 
traditional export crops. That is because the second largest export crop prior to 
independence was a food crop. Therefore, the risk of an export oriented strategy 
jeopardizing food security was minimal. To help the country realize its export potential 
and regain a share of the world market, the government made massive investments in 
rural infrastructure, along with major agricultural policy reforms that stimulated local 
production, food safety, and restricted food imports. In particular the government 
development efforts included: reestablishment of roads and the railways; development of 
appropriate sets of policy alternatives that promoted foreign direct investment as well as 
local private investment in agriculture production systems; and the development of a 
functional market information system. On the other hand, commercial banks made credit 
delivery processes more expeditious and more efficient, agricultural schools, research and 
extension services became more responsive to the needs of farming communities, by 
addressing primarily production concerns faced by farmers. As a result of those changes, 
production costs have declined dramatically and locally produced goods have become 
competitive on regional markets. In response to these development efforts, medium and 
large commercial farmers made considerable investments in cash crops, including fruits 
and vegetables. Smallholder farmers were also able to seize the opportunity and in 
addition to producing staple food crops, they embarked on production of fruits and 
vegetables for export markets. Therefore, for the past few years the agricultural sector has 
generated more jobs for rural people thereby driving down the rural-urban exodus; rural 
poverty has been declining, and for the past few years the sector has steadily been the 
second largest contributor to the GDP.   
 
In summary: Since the government adopted appropriate agricultural development 
strategies, both foreign and domestic entrepreneurs made investments that supported 
agricultural production. Large and medium scale farmers were the primary beneficiaries 
of an export oriented strategy. However, as the sector gained stability, there was a pull 
effect to attract smallholder farmers to make a leap into more commercial farming 
activities. 111 
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7. Assuming you support the occurrence of this scenario, what would you 









Scenario 3:  Renaissance of a Productive Smallholder Farming Sector  
Angolan agriculture of 2012 has been driven largely by the government belief that to 
have a prosperous agricultural sector it required having a dynamic and robust smallholder 
farming sub-sector. The government also believed that the single most important limiting 
factor in promoting a smallholder-led agricultural development strategy was lack of 
credit. Therefore, as part of a general agricultural development policy, the government 
created a development bank with the mandate to provide loans to emerging businesses 
that showed strong potential to generate income on a sustainable basis. Smallholder 
farmers organized in producer groups were given top priority over other economic sub-
sectors. Likewise, urban residents who proved to have farming experience and decided to 
settle in rural areas and start farming were given priority in accessing loans. A few crops 
were named to command the list of preferred smallholder farming business. In addition, 
the government institutionalized a credit guarantee scheme to encourage commercial 
banks lend to smallholder farmers with reduced risk of losses to default. NGOs that have 
been implementing micro-credit programs were invited to provide technical assistance to 
the newly established development bank, in addition to their existing working 
relationships with commercial banks. As result of this policy instrument, smallholder 
farmers were better able to access credit which in turn has resulted in their using more 
fertilizer, making more capital investment in irrigation systems, farm improvements and 
storage facilities. Farm productivity has increased and production of most crops has been 
rising steadily. Default rates have been lower than 8% over the last five years. With 
stabilization of smallholder farming sub-sector, there has been a steady flow of private 
investments in agricultural processing, input supply, network of rural supply of consumer 
goods and rural transportation system. Therefore, agricultural credit has played a crucial 
role in creating jobs, and promoting rural development.  
 
In summary: Agricultural credit has played a critical role in promoting rural 
development. Smallholder farmers have been the primary beneficiaries of credits and 
they have demonstrated their ability to become the engine of economic growth. It has 
also been demonstrated that because the smallholder commercial agriculture was 
provided with adequate resources, it contributed significantly to rural development.    
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b) Smallholder commercial farmers; 
 
 
c) Medium and large scale farmers;  
 
d) Formal markets; 
 
 
e) Informal markets;  
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5. How likely is this scenario to occur (please rate your perceptions from 1 to 5, 1 
being the least probable and 5 the most probable)?  
 
Highly probable 1 ____; 2 ____; 3 _____; 4 ____; 5 ____ Highly improbable 
 
 




7. Assuming you support the occurrence of this scenario, what would you 
do/recommend for it to occur? 
 
  




9. What would you do/recommend to ensure sustainability of credit systems and 
sustainability of farming business? 
  
Scenario 4: Agricultural Decline Scenario 116 
 
As we look at the Angolan agriculture in 2012, we can see that it has declined steadily 
over the last five years. Given the favorable oil prices of the past few years, the Angolan 
economy has been reported to be one of fastest growing economies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, in spite of high revenues realized by the government, there was lack of 
government commitment to make investment in the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure 
such as roads and rail network, health posts, schools, potable water, and rural markets. 
The government perceived agriculture as a backward, non-prosperous sector, therefore 
neglected it altogether. Furthermore, the government developed the belief that food 
imports to meet domestic demand were cheaper than making the necessary investment to 
produce the food locally. Commercial imports, complemented with foreign aid flooded 
the markets with food commodities. Locally produced commodities became non-
competitive to the cheaply imported similar goods. Therefore, no private investment in 
off farm businesses was made, food supply chains became inefficient and the whole 
farming industry became stagnant. As a result of this strategy, local production fell below 
subsistence levels. The standards of living of rural families deteriorated further because 
smallholder farmers could no longer generate incomes to sustain themselves. The 
deterioration of rural standards of living resulted in new waves of influx of rural families 
into towns, with the consequence that the once prosperous farmers became unskilled 
urban labor force. The pressure on limited urban resources grew beyond capacity, 
therefore urban standards of living declined, both rural and urban poverty levels rose. As 
a result of increasing poverty levels and deterioration of living standards, there has been 
more social instability.   
 
In summary: Lack of appropriate government strategy to promote agricultural 
development has affected both rural and urban populations. The impact of a declining 
agricultural sector transcended the downward trend of the agricultural sector and was felt 
across all sectors of the economy, and it stimulated social instability.      
 
Roundtable discussion leading questions: 
Round 1 
1. What aspects of this scenario can be expected to reflect the future of the 
agricultural sector in Angola? 
 
2. What aspects of this scenario cannot be expected to reflect the future of the 
agricultural sector in Angola?  
 







1. What factors are likely to promote the occurrence of this scenario (please name 












2. What factors are likely to prevent this scenario from occurring (please name not 










3.  What role do you think the government should play to prevent the occurrence of 
this scenario?  
 
4. What role do you think the following institutions should play to prevent the 
occurrence of this scenario? 
 






c) Smallholder commercial farmers; 
 
 
d) Medium and large scale farmers;  
 
 
e) Formal markets (supermarkets); 
 
 
f) Informal markets;  
 
 




h) Commercial banks;  
 
 
5. How likely is this scenario to occur (please rate your perceptions from 1 to 5, 1 
being the least probable and 5 the most probable)?  
 
Highly probable: 1 ____; 2 ____; 3 _____; 4 ____; 5 ____ Highly improbable 
 
6. Would you support the occurrence of this scenario? (why, or why not) 
 
7. Assuming you do not support the occurrence of this scenario, what would you 
do/recommend for it not to occur? 
 

































Appendix 1-B: Pre-test and Post-test Survey Instruments 
 
Emerging from 27 Years of Civil War: Developing Strategy Options for  
Re-launching a Vibrant Angolan Agricultural Sector 
 




















NGO  Others 
(specify) 
 
               
 
 
1.  What factors would help to promote sustainable economic development in Angola, over 
 the next five years (please rate the factors from 1 to 5, 1 being the least important factor and 5 
the most important factor)? 
Factor  Least Important  Most Important 
More Production of Diamonds  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
More production of oil  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Agricultural production incentives  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Private investment in agriculture  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Integrated development agenda  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Govt. subsidized agric. credit system  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 


















2. Which development approaches would have an impact on poverty alleviation, over the  
next five years (please rate the factors from 1 to 5, 1 being the least important factor and 5 the 
most important factor)?   
Approach  Least Important  Most Important 
Investment in rural infrastructure  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Support to rural off-farm activities  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Income redistribution  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Investment in smallholder agric production  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Investment in large scale commercial agric  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Increase urban employment  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Combination of approaches (please specify  
and rate them) 
 
 
3. How much potential does agriculture have to contribute to economic growth in Angola  
(please rate the potential from 1 to 5, 1 no potential and 5 high potential)? 
 
No potential 1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____High potential 
 
 
4. How likely do you foresee the government taking appropriate actions to promote the 
development of the agricultural sector (please rate your expectations from 1 to 5, 1 being highly 
unlikely and 5 highly likely)?   
 
Highly Unlikely 1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____Highly likely 
 
5. What agricultural strategies for Angola are you familiar with (please check in the 
box as appropriate)?  
MINADER   
FAO   
USAID   
EU   
The World Bank   
Others (please, list them) 
 
 
N/A   
 
 
5.1 Which of the strategies you have identified above are most compatible with the 







6. What factors would stimulate the establishment of sustainable food supply chains (please rate 
the factors from 1 to 5, 1 being the least important factor and 5 the most important factor)? 
Factor  Least Important  Most Important 
More Government support to Private I   1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
More Government Owned Supermarke   1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Better Coordination Among donors  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Better Storage Facilities  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
More Production Efficiency  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Higher Farmers Profit Margins  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
More Privately Owned Supermarkets  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
More Proactive Informal Markets  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
University/Govt./Industry Training Mo       1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Others (please specify and rate them)   
7. What development program would help Angola have a functional and sustainable agri- 
cultural development strategy, over the next five years (please rate the factors from 1 to 5, 1  
being the least important factor and 5 the most important factor)? 
Program  Least Important  Most Important 
Focus on production for export  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Focus on production for import substitution  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Strengthening agric schools  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Strengthening research and extension  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Better coordination between govt. and donors  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Availability of agric credit  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Strong private sector  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 




8. How optimistic are you about the government taking appropriate actions to promote 
development of the agricultural sector, within the next five years (please rate your optimism  
from 1 to 5, 1 being not optimistic and 5 being highly optimistic)?  
 
Not optimistic 1 ____; 2 ____; 3 _____; 4 _____; 5 _____ Highly optimistic 
 
 
9. How do you characterize current productivity (yield/per hectare) of the main crops in this 
region?  
  








10. What factors have accounted for the current production levels (please rate the factors from 1 
to 5, 1 being the least important factor and 5 the most important factor)?  
Factor  Least Important  Most Important 
Agricultural Technologies  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Quality of Seed  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Fertilizer  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Irrigation  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Land Availability  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Availability of agric credit  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 




11. What factors would help improve current production levels, over the next five years  
(please rate the factors from 1 to 5, 1 being the least important factor and 5 the most important 
factor)? 
Factor  Least Important  Most Important 
Roads and rail ways  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Market information systems  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Storage facilities  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Cold storage  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Pricing system  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Transportation costs  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Inputs distribution system  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Agricultural technologies  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Government support  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Development policies  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 




12. What factors would help smallholder farmers increase productivity, over the next five  
years (please rate the factors from 1 to 5, 1 being the least important factor and 5 the most 
important factor)? 
Factor  Least Important  Most Important 
Input handouts  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Training  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Functional input retail systems  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Access to farm machinery  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Functional price information system  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Access to credit  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Integrated marketing systems  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Irrigation  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Better land tenure  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Others (please specify and rate them) 






13. What crops generate the most income to farmers in this region (please rate the crops  
from 1 to 5, 1 being the crop that earns the least income and 5 the crop that earns the most 
income)? 
Crop  Lowest Income  Highest Income 
Maize    1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Cassava    1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Potatoes    1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Beans    1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Peanuts    1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Fruits (please specify and rate them):  
 
 




14. Which markets do the products from this region go to?  Please put in a percentage (%) for 
each region.   
 
Luanda ____; Benguela ____; Cabinda ____;  Huambo ____;  Local markets ____;  
 
Other markets (please name them): 
 
15. Who handles the function of getting the product to the market?  Please put in a percentage 
(%) for each method. 
 
Customers come over _____; 
 
We sell by the road _____; 
 
NGOs provide transport ____;  
 
We pool the product together and hire a truck ____; 
 
We do individual sells to retailers ____;  
 
We have a contract with buyers ____; 
 
Other (please explain):_____________________________________ 
 
16. Who are your main trading partners?  Please put in a percentage (%) for each type 
 of partner. 
 
Catering companies (%): ____;  124 
 
 
Informal traders (%): ____;  
 
Supermarkets (%) ____;  
 
Wholesalers (%) ____;  
 
Other (please list them):__________________________________________ 
 
17. Which agricultural products would give Angola a comparative advantage in international 
trade? (please rate the factors from 1 to 5, 1 being the least important factor and 5 the most 
important factor)?    
Product  Least Important  Most Important 
Fruits (please specify and rate  theme)  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Vegetables (please specify and rate  them)  
 
1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Cereals (please specify and rate them) 
 
1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Roots and tubers (please specify and rate them) 
 
1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 




18. How important is the informal market to the (please rate the factors from 1 to 5, 1  
being the least important factor and 5 the most important factor)?  
Factor  Least Important  Most Important 
Overall economic growth of the country  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Rural economy  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Urban economy  1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Agricultural sector  
 
1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Marketing of fresh fruits 
 
1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 
Marketing of vegetables 
 
1 ____; 2 ____; 3 ____; 4 ____; 5 ____ 









Appendix 2: Province Group Crosstab Results  
   
   Crosstab 
 
province * q01dia * prov groups 
 
Count  
prov groups     q01dia  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  2  5  12  4  6  29 
      3  2  1  1  0  4  8 
   Total  4  6  13  4  10  37 
province with post-test  province  2  6  1  2  3  11  23 
      4  2  2  8  12  20  44 
      5  3  11  13  4  6  37 
   Total  11  14  23  19  37  104 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  6.573(a)  4  .160 
   Likelihood Ratio  7.171  4  .127 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .064  1  .801 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  32.764(b)  8  .000 
   Likelihood Ratio  32.135  8  .000 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.670  1  .196 
   N of Valid Cases  104       
a  8 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .86. 
b  6 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.43. 
 




prov groups     q01oil  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  0  2  12  8  8  30 
      3  1  2  1  0  4  8 
   Total  1  4  13  8  12  38 
province with post-test  province  2  6  1  2  4  10  23 
      4  1  1  4  11  30  47 
      5  0  8  13  3  12  36 








  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  10.385(a)  4  .034 
   Likelihood Ratio  11.241  4  .024 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .275  1  .600 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  43.395(b)  8  .000 
   Likelihood Ratio  39.844  8  .000 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .186  1  .666 
   N of Valid Cases  106       
a  7 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
b  8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.52. 
 
province * q01agr * prov groups 
 
 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q01agr  Total 
      2  3  4  5  2 
province without post-test  province  1  0  1  8  22  31 
      3  2  1  2  5  10 
   Total  2  2  10  27  41 
province with post-test  province  2  1  0  7  14  22 
      4  0  2  9  44  55 
      5  1  1  1  37  40 
   Total  2  3  17  95  117 
 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  7.521(a)  3  .057 
   Likelihood Ratio  6.898  3  .075 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  5.288  1  .021 
   N of Valid Cases 
41       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  13.044(b)  6  .042 
   Likelihood Ratio  15.171  6  .019 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  3.856  1  .050 
   N of Valid Cases  117       
a  5 cells (62.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .49. 
b  7 cells (58.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38. 127 
 
 
province * q01priv * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q01priv  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1     0  0  3  28  31 
      3     1  4  1  3  9 
   Total     1  4  4  31  40 
province with post-test  province  2  0     6  5  10  21 
      4  0     5  12  34  51 
      5  1     0  9  30  40 
   Total  1     11  26  74  112 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  20.160(a)  3  .000 
   Likelihood Ratio  18.442  3  .000 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  17.795  1  .000 
   N of Valid Cases 
40       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  14.827(b)  6  .022 
   Likelihood Ratio  16.535  6  .011 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  5.832  1  .016 
   N of Valid Cases  112       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23. 
b  6 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19. 
 
province * q01intdv * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q01intdv  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  1  1  3  11  13  29 
      3  0  0  0  3  5  8 
   Total  1  1  3  14  18  37 
province with post-test  province  2  1  0  2  5  10  18 
      4  0  6  6  9  25  46 
      5  0  1  4  8  25  38 
   Total  1  7  12  22  60  102 
 










  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  1.782(a)  4  .776 
   Likelihood Ratio  2.815  4  .589 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.477  1  .224 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  10.489(b)  8  .232 
   Likelihood Ratio  10.262  8  .247 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .650  1  .420 
   N of Valid Cases  102       
a  8 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b  9 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .18. 
 
province * q01gvsub * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q01gvsub  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  1  2  1  1  25  30 
      3  0  0  1  5  4  10 
   Total  1  2  2  6  29  40 
province with post-test  province  2  1  2  1  2  13  19 
      4  1  0  2  7  41  51 
      5  2  1  1  9  25  38 
   Total  4  3  4  18  79  108 
 
province * q06priva * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06priva  Total 
      2  3  4  5  2 
province without post-test  province  1     0  2  26  28 
      3     2  2  6  10 
   Total     2  4  32  38 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  3  19  22 
      4  0  2  8  41  51 
      5  1  2  3  34  40 
   Total  1  4  14  94  113 
 











  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  7.702(a)  2  .021 
   Likelihood Ratio  7.371  2  .025 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  7.384  1  .007 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  4.203(b)  6  .649 
   Likelihood Ratio  5.298  6  .506 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .625  1  .429 
   N of Valid Cases  113       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .53. 
b  8 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19. 
 
province * q06gsupr * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06gsupr  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  1  8  8  3  10  30 
      3  2  1  2  2  2  9 
   Total  3  9  10  5  12  39 
province with post-test  province  2  6  0  1  5  10  22 
      4  4  4  3  13  24  48 
      5  11  8  3  4  12  38 
   Total  21  12  7  22  46  108 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  5.075(a)  4  .280 
   Likelihood Ratio  4.486  4  .344 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .396  1  .529 
   N of Valid Cases 
39       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  16.584(b)  8  .035 
   Likelihood Ratio  19.251  8  .014 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.928  1  .165 
   N of Valid Cases  108       
a  7 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .69. 





province * q06donor * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06donor  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  1  1  2  11  13  28 
      3  0  0  2  4  3  9 
   Total  1  1  4  15  16  37 
province with post-test  province  2  2  2  1  5  11  21 
      4  0  3  7  11  24  45 
      5  1  0  4  11  20  36 
   Total  3  5  12  27  55  102 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.390(a)  4  .664 
   Likelihood Ratio  2.669  4  .615 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .082  1  .774 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  9.207(b)  8  .325 
   Likelihood Ratio  11.107  8  .196 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.618  1  .203 
   N of Valid Cases  102       
a  8 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24. 
b  8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .62. 
 
province * q06stora * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06stora  Total 
      2  3  4  5  2 
province without post-test  province  1     0  3  25  28 
      3     2  3  4  9 
   Total     2  6  29  37 
province with post-test  province  2  1  2  3  16  22 
      4  0  2  14  35  51 
      5  0  2  10  27  39 












  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  10.118(a)  2  .006 
   Likelihood Ratio  9.468  2  .009 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  9.761  1  .002 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  6.177(b)  6  .404 
   Likelihood Ratio  5.438  6  .489 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .337  1  .562 
   N of Valid Cases  112       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .49. 
b  6 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20. 
 
province * q06effic * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06effic  Total 
      2  3  4  5  2 
province without post-test  province  1     1  2  25  28 
      3     0  2  7  9 
   Total     1  4  32  37 
province with post-test  province  2  0  2  3  17  22 
      4  0  1  14  33  48 
      5  1  2  5  33  41 
   Total  1  5  22  83  111 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  1.858(a)  2  .395 
   Likelihood Ratio  1.889  2  .389 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .220  1  .639 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  7.545(b)  6  .273 
   Likelihood Ratio  7.727  6  .259 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .024  1  .878 
   N of Valid Cases  111       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24. 






province * q06profi * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06profi  Total 
      2  3  4  5  2 
province without post-test  province  1  1  5  5  20  31 
      3  0  1  2  4  7 
   Total  1  6  7  24  38 
province with post-test  province  2  1  4  3  13  21 
      4  2  5  12  25  44 
      5  2  9  5  19  35 
   Total  5  18  20  57  100 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  .767(a)  3  .857 
   Likelihood Ratio  .897  3  .826 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .001  1  .980 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  4.515(b)  6  .607 
   Likelihood Ratio  4.521  6  .607 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .344  1  .558 
   N of Valid Cases  100       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .18. 
b  5 cells (41.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.05. 
 
province * q06psupr * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06psupr  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1     3  2  6  15  26 
      3     0  2  3  1  6 
   Total     3  4  9  16  32 
province with post-test  province  2  1  1  2  7  10  21 
      4  0  7  6  15  20  48 
      5  1  4  4  10  15  34 












  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  6.154(a)  3  .104 
   Likelihood Ratio  6.401  3  .094 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .930  1  .335 
   N of Valid Cases 
32       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  3.475(b)  8  .901 
   Likelihood Ratio  4.357  8  .824 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .235  1  .628 
   N of Valid Cases  103       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .56. 
b  7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .41. 
 
province * q06infor * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06infor  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  2  2  6  3  13  26 
      3  1  1  1  3  1  7 
   Total  3  3  7  6  14  33 
province with post-test  province  2  2  2  2  3  10  19 
      4  5  5  12  9  12  43 
      5  3  1  4  8  19  35 
   Total  10  8  18  20  41  97 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  5.362(a)  4  .252 
   Likelihood Ratio  5.203  4  .267 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.090  1  .296 
   N of Valid Cases 
33       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  9.848(b)  8  .276 
   Likelihood Ratio  10.367  8  .240 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .262  1  .609 
   N of Valid Cases  97       
a  8 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64. 






province * q06train * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q06train  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        2  7  19  28 
      3        1  1  7  9 
   Total        3  8  26  37 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  1  2  14  17 
      4  0  1  3  7  27  38 
      5  1  0  0  9  24  34 
   Total  1  1  4  18  65  89 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  .835(a)  2  .659 
   Likelihood Ratio  .917  2  .632 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .059  1  .808 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  7.107(b)  8  .525 
   Likelihood Ratio  9.157  8  .329 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .461  1  .497 
   N of Valid Cases  89       
a  3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .73. 
b  10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19. 
 
province * q07pexpo * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q07pexpo  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  7  1 
province without post-test  province  1  1  3  6  5  13     28 
      3  0  2  2  0  4     8 
   Total  1  5  8  5  17     36 
province with post-test  province  2  5  1  1  5  9  0  21 
      4  5  2  6  16  19  1  49 
      5  2  5  5  7  14  0  33 












  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.681(a)  4  .613 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.861  4  .425 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .130  1  .719 
   N of Valid Cases 
36       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  10.528(b)  10  .395 
   Likelihood Ratio  10.418  10  .405 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .384  1  .536 
   N of Valid Cases  103       
a  8 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b  10 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20. 
 
province * q07pimpo * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q07pimpo  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1           0  27  27 
      3           3  7  10 
   Total           3  34  37 
province with post-test  province  2  0  1  0  4  17  22 
      4  2  1  1  3  42  49 
      5  3  1  1  4  30  39 
   Total  5  3  2  11  89  110 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 










province without post-test  Pearson Chi-
Square  8.815(b)  1  .003       
   Continuity 
Correction(a)  5.248  1  .022       
   Likelihood Ratio  8.606  1  .003       
   Fisher's Exact Test           .015  .015 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  8.576  1  .003       
   N of Valid Cases  37             
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-
Square  5.225(c)  8  .733       
   Likelihood Ratio  6.256  8  .619       
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .642  1  .423       
   N of Valid Cases  110             
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 136 
 
b  2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .81. 
c  12 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .40. 
 
province * q07schoo * prov groups 
 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q07schoo  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        2  5  24  31 
      3        2  2  6  10 
   Total        4  7  30  41 
province with post-test  province  2  1  0  3  2  16  22 
      4  0  2  1  6  42  51 
      5  1  1  0  3  35  40 
   Total  2  3  4  11  93  113 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  1.802(a)  2  .406 
   Likelihood Ratio  1.609  2  .447 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.656  1  .198 
   N of Valid Cases 
41       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  11.794(b)  8  .161 
   Likelihood Ratio  11.746  8  .163 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.903  1  .168 
   N of Valid Cases  113       
a  3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .98. 
b  12 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39. 
 
province * q07resea * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q07resea  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        1  11  17  29 
      3        0  2  7  9 
   Total        1  13  24  38 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  2  8  11  21 
      4  2  2  2  7  32  45 
      5  1  0  2  10  25  38 











  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  1.205(a)  2  .547 
   Likelihood Ratio  1.466  2  .480 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.172  1  .279 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  8.208(b)  8  .413 
   Likelihood Ratio  9.378  8  .311 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .148  1  .700 
   N of Valid Cases  104       
a  3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24. 
b  9 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .40. 
 
province * q07coord * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q07coord  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1     2  3  5  17  27 
      3     0  0  3  4  7 
   Total     2  3  8  21  34 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  3  4  13  20 
      4  2  2  3  16  28  51 
      5  2  0  4  6  26  38 
   Total  4  2  10  26  67  109 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.726(a)  3  .436 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.539  3  .316 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .283  1  .595 
   N of Valid Cases 
34       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  7.765(b)  8  .457 
   Likelihood Ratio  9.236  8  .323 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .091  1  .762 
   N of Valid Cases  109       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .41. 






province * q07credi * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q07credi  Total 
      1  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1     1  0  29  30 
      3     1  4  5  10 
   Total     2  4  34  40 
province with post-test  province  2  0  2  2  16  20 
      4  1  0  3  47  51 
      5  0  1  2  38  41 
   Total  1  3  7  101  112 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  14.588(a)  2  .001 
   Likelihood Ratio  13.819  2  .001 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  8.000  1  .005 
   N of Valid Cases 
40       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  7.438(b)  6  .282 
   Likelihood Ratio  7.469  6  .280 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.880  1  .170 
   N of Valid Cases  112       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50. 
b  9 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .18. 
 
province * q07priva * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q07priva  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        1  3  25  29 
      3        2  3  3  8 
   Total        3  6  28  37 
province with post-test  province  2  2  0  1  3  13  19 
      4  0  1  1  9  36  47 
      5  1  1  2  2  32  38 












  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  8.409(a)  2  .015 
   Likelihood Ratio  7.429  2  .024 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  7.898  1  .005 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  9.871(b)  8  .274 
   Likelihood Ratio  10.494  8  .232 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.894  1  .169 
   N of Valid Cases  104       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .65. 
b  10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37. 
 
province * q08optim * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q08optim  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  3  0  7  7  13  30 
      3  0  2  2  2  2  8 
   Total  3  2  9  9  15  38 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  4  3  13  20 
      4  0  0  3  12  37  52 
      5  3  3  9  12  12  39 
   Total  3  3  16  27  62  111 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  8.853(a)  4  .065 
   Likelihood Ratio  8.264  4  .082 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .648  1  .421 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  24.523(b)  8  .002 
   Likelihood Ratio  27.170  8  .001 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  7.537  1  .006 
   N of Valid Cases  111       
a  7 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .42. 






province * q11roads * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11roads  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  1  2  3  6  15  27 
      3  0  0  0  2  7  9 
   Total  1  2  3  8  22  36 
province with post-test  province  2  0     0  5  18  23 
      4  1     1  3  46  51 
      5  0     2  5  35  42 
   Total  1     3  13  99  116 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.545(a)  4  .637 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.969  4  .410 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  2.183  1  .140 
   N of Valid Cases 
36       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  6.596(b)  6  .360 
   Likelihood Ratio  7.191  6  .304 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .001  1  .975 
   N of Valid Cases  116       
a  7 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25. 
b  8 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20. 
 
province * q11infsy * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11infsy  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  1  1  1  11  14  28 
      3  0  0  1  3  4  8 
   Total  1  1  2  14  18  36 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  3  8  11  22 
      4  0  2  4  20  20  46 
      5  1  3  5  7  21  37 












  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  1.469(a)  4  .832 
   Likelihood Ratio  1.749  4  .782 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .059  1  .809 
   N of Valid Cases 
36       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  8.826(b)  8  .357 
   Likelihood Ratio  10.284  8  .246 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .503  1  .478 
   N of Valid Cases  105       
a  8 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b  8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
 
province * q11stora * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11stora  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  1     2  5  18  26 
      3  0     1  5  1  7 
   Total  1     3  10  19  33 
province with post-test  province  2  1  3  4  4  9  21 
      4  2  2  7  14  16  41 
      5  1  1  4  13  14  33 
   Total  4  6  15  31  39  95 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  8.384(a)  3  .039 
   Likelihood Ratio  8.588  3  .035 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.705  1  .192 
   N of Valid Cases 
33       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  5.195(b)  8  .737 
   Likelihood Ratio  4.986  8  .759 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.200  1  .273 
   N of Valid Cases  95       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 






province * q11colds * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11colds  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  0     2  6  20  28 
      3  1     0  2  4  7 
   Total  1     2  8  24  35 
province with post-test  province  2  1  1  3  5  10  20 
      4  1  1  8  10  25  45 
      5  2  1  9  9  14  35 
   Total  4  3  20  24  49  100 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  4.792(a)  3  .188 
   Likelihood Ratio  4.404  3  .221 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.928  1  .165 
   N of Valid Cases 
35       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  3.043(b)  8  .932 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.045  8  .931 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .310  1  .578 
   N of Valid Cases  100       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20. 
b  8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .60. 
 
province * q11prici * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11prici  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  0  1  4  8  15  28 
      3  1  0  1  2  4  8 
   Total  1  1  5  10  19  36 
province with post-test  province  2  0  4  2  4  11  21 
      4  1  3  4  14  28  50 
      5  0  1  2  10  23  36 












  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  3.844(a)  4  .428 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.570  4  .467 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .647  1  .421 
   N of Valid Cases 
36       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  7.294(b)  8  .505 
   Likelihood Ratio  6.933  8  .544 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  3.200  1  .074 
   N of Valid Cases  107       
a  8 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b  9 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20. 
 
province * q11trans * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11trans  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1     2  3  6  16  27 
      3     0  0  5  3  8 
   Total     2  3  11  19  35 
province with post-test  province  2  1  2  2  4  9  18 
      4  0  3  3  15  29  50 
      5  0  1  2  11  20  34 
   Total  1  6  7  30  58  102 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  5.205(a)  3  .157 
   Likelihood Ratio  5.896  3  .117 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .014  1  .906 
   N of Valid Cases 
35       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  7.185(b)  8  .517 
   Likelihood Ratio  5.888  8  .660 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  3.119  1  .077 
   N of Valid Cases  102       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .46. 






province * q11input * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11input  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1     1  3  5  17  26 
      3     0  0  4  3  7 
   Total     1  3  9  20  33 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  1  4  15  20 
      4  0  0  8  7  32  47 
      5  1  5  2  5  26  39 
   Total  1  5  11  16  73  106 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  4.445(a)  3  .217 
   Likelihood Ratio  4.832  3  .185 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .010  1  .922 
   N of Valid Cases 
33       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  14.494(b)  8  .070 
   Likelihood Ratio  16.205  8  .040 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  2.671  1  .102 
   N of Valid Cases  106       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
b  10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19. 
 
province * q11atech * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11atech  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1           3  25  28 
      3           2  7  9 
   Total           5  32  37 
province with post-test  province  2  1  1  1  3  15  21 
      4  0  1  3  3  43  50 
      5  0  1  1  5  33  40 












  Chi-Square Tests 
 










province without post-test  Pearson Chi-
Square  .772(b)  1  .380       
   Continuity 
Correction(a)  .101  1  .750       
   Likelihood Ratio  .704  1  .402       
   Fisher's Exact Test           .577  .352 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .751  1  .386       
   N of Valid Cases  37             
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-
Square  7.154(c)  8  .520       
   Likelihood Ratio  6.261  8  .618       
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  2.501  1  .114       
   N of Valid Cases  111             
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b  2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.22. 
c  12 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19. 
 
province * q11gvsup * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11gvsup  Total 
      2  3  4  5  2 
province without post-test  province  1     3  3  24  30 
      3     0  4  5  9 
   Total     3  7  29  39 
province with post-test  province  2  0  4  1  16  21 
      4  1  0  2  48  51 
      5  2  1  5  31  39 
   Total  3  5  8  95  111 
 

















prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  6.033(a)  2  .049 
   Likelihood Ratio  5.913  2  .052 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .374  1  .541 
   N of Valid Cases 
39       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  17.467(b)  6  .008 
   Likelihood Ratio  15.643  6  .016 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .337  1  .562 
   N of Valid Cases  111       
a  3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .69. 
b  9 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .57. 
 
 
province * q11polic * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q11polic  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        1  6  21  28 
      3        0  1  9  10 
   Total        1  7  30  38 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  1  3  14  18 
      4  0  2  0  16  32  50 
      5  1  0  1  4  31  37 
   Total  1  2  2  23  77  105 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  1.090(a)  2  .580 
   Likelihood Ratio  1.408  2  .495 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.060  1  .303 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  12.198(b)  8  .143 
   Likelihood Ratio  13.929  8  .084 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .002  1  .962 
   N of Valid Cases  105       
a  3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .26. 
b  10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17. 
 
province * q12input * prov groups 




prov groups     q12input  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1     0  2  6  19  27 
      3     1  1  2  4  8 
   Total     1  3  8  23  35 
province with post-test  province  2  0  1  1  6  12  20 
      4  1  0  2  8  34  45 
      5  1  5  3  6  17  32 











  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  3.972(a)  3  .264 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.558  3  .313 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  2.576  1  .108 
   N of Valid Cases 
35       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  11.452(b)  8  .177 
   Likelihood Ratio  13.110  8  .108 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.719  1  .190 
   N of Valid Cases  97       
a  5 cells (62.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23. 
b  10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .41. 
 
province * q12train * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q12train  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        1  2  26  29 
      3        0  1  8  9 
   Total        1  3  34  38 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  2  3  17  22 
      4  1  1  3  9  38  52 
      5  3  0  2  4  28  37 
   Total  4  1  7  16  83  111 
 






prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  .465(a)  2  .792 
   Likelihood Ratio  .684  2  .710 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .029  1  .865 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  5.447(b)  8  .709 
   Likelihood Ratio  6.139  8  .632 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .765  1  .382 
   N of Valid Cases  111       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24. 





province * q12retai * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q12retai  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        4  5  18  27 
      3        0  1  6  7 
   Total        4  6  24  34 
province with post-test  province  2  0  1  2  4  11  18 
      4  1  3  6  11  28  49 
      5  0  3  2  10  17  32 
   Total  1  7  10  25  56  99 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  1.379(a)  2  .502 
   Likelihood Ratio  2.176  2  .337 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.296  1  .255 
   N of Valid Cases 
34       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.902(b)  8  .940 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.309  8  .913 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .146  1  .702 
   N of Valid Cases  99       
a  5 cells (83.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .82. 
b  10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .18. 
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province * q12machi * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q12machi  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1     1  0  1  28  30 
      3     0  3  0  5  8 
   Total     1  3  1  33  38 
province with post-test  province  2  0  1  3  2  16  22 
      4  1  1  1  13  37  53 
      5  0  1  2  3  31  37 











  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  12.475(a)  3  .006 
   Likelihood Ratio  11.042  3  .012 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  4.588  1  .032 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  10.602(b)  8  .225 
   Likelihood Ratio  10.611  8  .225 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.128  1  .288 
   N of Valid Cases  112       
a  6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
b  10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20. 
 
province * q12infsy * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q12infsy  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        3  7  16  26 
      3        1  2  3  6 
   Total        4  9  19  32 
province with post-test  province  2  0  1  4  4  10  19 
      4  1  2  6  11  29  49 
      5  0  1  2  12  19  34 
   Total  1  4  12  27  58  102 150 
 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  .283(a)  2  .868 
   Likelihood Ratio  .277  2  .870 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .263  1  .608 
   N of Valid Cases 
32       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  5.280(b)  8  .727 
   Likelihood Ratio  5.562  8  .696 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .777  1  .378 
   N of Valid Cases  102       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .75. 





province * q12credi * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q12credi  Total 
      2  3  4  5  2 
province without post-test  province  1     0  3  25  28 
      3     1  1  8  10 
   Total     1  4  33  38 
province with post-test  province  2  0     2  16  18 
      4  2     6  44  52 
      5  0     4  35  39 
   Total  2     12  95  109 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.877(a)  2  .237 
   Likelihood Ratio  2.748  2  .253 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.438  1  .230 
   N of Valid Cases 
38       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.300(b)  4  .681 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.069  4  .546 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .009  1  .925 
   N of Valid Cases  109       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .26. 
b  5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .33. 151 
 
 
province * q12markt * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q12markt  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        1  9  19  29 
      3        0  2  6  8 
   Total        1  11  25  37 
province with post-test  province  2  0  2  2  4  10  18 
      4  1  1  8  15  20  45 
      5  0  0  3  11  19  33 











  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  .436(a)  2  .804 
   Likelihood Ratio  .649  2  .723 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .362  1  .548 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  8.423(b)  8  .393 
   Likelihood Ratio  8.445  8  .391 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .939  1  .332 
   N of Valid Cases  96       
a  3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b  8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19. 
 
province * q12irrig * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q12irrig  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1        2  2  24  28 
      3        0  2  7  9 
   Total        2  4  31  37 
province with post-test  province  2  0  0  6  2  12  20 
      4  2  1  4  9  30  46 
      5  0  0  5  7  21  33 
   Total  2  1  15  18  63  99 152 
 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.127(a)  2  .345 
   Likelihood Ratio  2.391  2  .302 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .002  1  .969 
   N of Valid Cases 
37       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  8.643(b)  8  .373 
   Likelihood Ratio  9.501  8  .302 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  .484  1  .486 
   N of Valid Cases  99       
a  4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .49. 





province * q12landt * prov groups 
  Crosstab 
 
Count  
prov groups     q12landt  Total 
      1  2  3  4  5  1 
province without post-test  province  1  2  2  3  2  20  29 
      3  0  0  0  1  6  7 
   Total  2  2  3  3  26  36 
province with post-test  province  2  1  2  1  1  13  18 
      4  2  2  5  5  35  49 
      5  1  0  0  2  33  36 
   Total  4  4  6  8  81  103 
 
  Chi-Square Tests 
 
prov groups     Value  df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
province without post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  2.278(a)  4  .685 
   Likelihood Ratio  3.558  4  .469 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  1.488  1  .223 
   N of Valid Cases 
36       
province with post-test  Pearson Chi-Square  9.694(b)  8  .287 
   Likelihood Ratio  12.047  8  .149 
   Linear-by-Linear 
Association  3.446  1  .063 
   N of Valid Cases  103       
a  8 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39. 
b  12 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70. 153 
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